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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents several empirical and methodological results in indus-
trial organization, with a focus on settings with microdata or lightly aggregated
data. Chapter 1 estimates a model of search and price discrimination in the US
home mortgage market, using microdata from two types of consumers to identify
the model. Consumers who fail to recall the interest rate pay more for their mort-
gages, with most of the disparity explained by price discrimination. Chapter 2
estimates an equilibrium model of the US auto insurance market. Consumers face
search and switching costs, which firms take into account in their pricing deci-
sions. Counterintuitively, consumers may be harmed in aggregate by lower search
costs. Chapter 3 considers the standard problem of estimating logit or mixed
logit demand, but in disaggregate data where markets are too small for the mar-
ket shares to reliably equal the choice probabilities. I adapt binomial regression
to estimate a multinomial logit model and show that a version of the Salanie´ and
Wolak (2019) linearization can be applied to binomial regression to approximate
the mixed logit model.
ix
Introduction
Industrial organization economists increasingly have access to disaggregate data on the
choices and characteristics of individual consumers, or of small groups of consumers. The
most apparent benefit of disaggregate data is to address questions about specific groups of
consumers who may have different preferences and shopping strategies, and who may in
some cases be treated differently by firms. However, research not focusing on consumer
heterogeneity may still benefit from disaggregate data as a rich source of identification.
Honka and Chintagunta (2017) for instance use microdata to empirically distinguish the se-
quential and simultaneous search models, a distinction that would not be evident with only
aggregate data on prices and quantities. In other cases, disaggregate data is used to answer
the same questions as aggregate data but with greater robustness. An example can be seen
in two papers on the automobile market: Murry and Zhou (2016) and Moraga-Gonza´lez,
Sa´ndor and Wildenbeest (2015). Both papers estimate a travel cost for the consumer to visit
and search a dealer (or in Murry and Zhou (2016), an agglomeration of dealers). Murry
and Zhou (2016) however take advantage of microdata on dealer and customer locations
in their estimation, while Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2015) must rely on an assumption that
consumers wishing to search vehicles of a certain brand do so at the dealer of that brand
nearest to their home.
Disaggregate data also presents challenges for common industrial organization models
developed for aggregate data. As discussed in Chapter 3, random utility models following
McFadden (1974) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) often rely on the large-market
assumption that the observed market shares are equal to the underlying choice probabilities.
This assumption may break down when markets are defined at a disaggregate level such as
a store or zip code over a few weeks, rather than e.g. the entire U.S. automobile market
over a year as modeled by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (hereafter BLP). In other
cases, the data may be consumer-level microdata with no imposed aggregation at all, as in
Chapters 1 and 2.
This dissertation examines several empirical and (in Chapter 3) methodological ques-
tions, with a focus on the use of disaggregate data. The first two chapters apply microdata
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(or in Chapter 2, a demand model already estimated from microdata) to estimate equilib-
rium models of consumer search. Chapter 1 investigates the causes of price dispersion in
the US home mortgage market. I show that the interest rate paid by a consumer is strongly
associated with whether the consumer was able to recall the interest rate on a survey. Con-
trolling for factors associated with the cost of lending, I estimate a model of sequential
search in which firms may price discriminate against inattentive consumers, identified as
those who subsequently fail to recall the interest rate. Because inattentive consumers tend
to search fewer lenders than their attentive counterparts, price discrimination against inat-
tentive consumers can be rational for firms. With only one type of consumer it would
not be possible to identify the strength of interest rate preferences versus preferences for
the (unobserved) other characteristics of the loan. However, identification is possible with
access to microdata containing (at least) two types of consumers who have different price
preferences and/or search costs. I find that most of the interest rate differential paid by inat-
tentive consumers can be explained by price discrimination, with only 10 percent explained
directly by consumer behavior.
Chapter 2 studies firms’ pricing decisions in light of search and switching costs. Switch-
ing costs are generally not identifiable from aggregate data, but can be identified from
microdata that reports consumer movements across firms. Using the microdata-derived de-
mand estimates of Honka (2014), I estimate each firm’s cost of providing insurance and
use the resulting estimates to simulate counterfactuals. While lower search and switching
costs would benefit an individual consumer, the counterfactual simulations show that this
benefit is eclipsed in aggregate by a supply-side response of increasing prices. Intuitively,
low search costs lessen the pressure on firms to compete to be searched. Firms instead
compete to be chosen after the consumer has searched them, at which point the firms have
market power due to the product differentiation that the consumer’s search has revealed.
Estimation relies on a combination of methods: automatic differentiation (with respect to
price) of a complicated demand function, a Markov chain model of consumer movements
across firms, and a linearized version of best response iteration to compute an equilibrium
for each counterfactual.
Chapter 3 turns to developing methods for lightly aggregated data, which falls between
consumer-level microdata and the large-market datasets traditionally used for demand es-
timation. I reframe the traditional logit demand estimation problem such that it can be
estimated by binomial regression, a fast and standard method in modern statistical soft-
ware. Compared to aggregate data methods, this approach is (1) robust to small markets
in which market shares may not equal choice probabilities and (2) unrestrictive in its fixed
effects structure, allowing for specifications that are less likely to overfit in small or disag-
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gregate samples. I adapt the Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) linearization to approximate a mixed
logit model at little additional computational cost, while showing that this linearization can
be applied without the additional instruments originally required by Salanie´ and Wolak
(2019). Monte Carlo simulations are used to validate binomial regression and compare it
to competing methods such as Gandhi et al. (2017).
As observed by Berry and Haile (2020),
micro data not only permits richer demand specifications but also can substan-
tially soften the reliance on instrumental variables, reducing both the number
and types of instruments required.
Yet it is not always apparent how models and methods originally conceived for aggregate
data can be adapted to micro or lightly aggregated data, or how to extend an unusually rich
microdata-informed demand specification to an equilibrium model. This dissertation aims
to provide methods and examples relevant to disaggregate data, and to address questions of
search, switching, and price discrimination where microdata shows special promise.
3
Chapter 1
Price Discrimination Against Inattentive
Mortgage Borrowers
Consumers differ in their willingness to spend time and effort searching for the best deal.
In a survey of recent mortgage borrowers, half of consumers reported seriously considering
only one lender or mortgage broker. Only 15 percent considered three or more. Consumers
with higher income and education were more likely to consider additional lenders (Avery
et al., 2017). As past work has noted, searching only one or two firms in this high-stakes
environment is a puzzling decision that reflects either an extremely high search cost or
simple confusion (Woodward and Hall (2012), Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017)).
At a glance, the low level of search might suggest that one mortgage is perceived to
be much like another. In reality interest rates are negotiated between borrower and lender,
with substantial dispersion in prices. Bhutta et al. (2018) show that price dispersion cannot
be fully explained by differences in creditworthiness, discount points paid, or even by the
consumer’s choice of lender. The 10th to 90th percentile range of interest rates adjusted
for these controls remains at 0.48 percentage points. This residual price dispersion may be
explained by the mortgage search and negotiation process. In particular, consumers may
have different strategies or levels of knowledge in searching for and choosing a lender.
To the extent that lenders observe these differences, they may adjust their rate offers or
negotiating strategies to price discriminate against consumers who appear more likely to
accept a high rate offer.
This paper estimates a search model of the mortgage market using a merged survey and
administrative dataset of recent borrowers. This contributes in two ways to the literature
on the US mortgage market. First, I show that consumers whose survey responses indicate
an inattentive approach to shopping tend to pay much higher interest rates, by as much as 1
percentage point on average. Second, much of this disparity is due to price discrimination
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against inattentive consumers. The central assumption underlying the price discrimination
result is that consumer inattention is unrelated to the cost of lending after controlling for
standard measures of creditworthiness.
The immediate policy implication of price discrimination is that encouraging con-
sumers to search more may be insufficient to improve their market outcomes. Inatten-
tive consumers continue to pay very high rates even when they search more extensively.
Consumer education must also empower borrowers to negotiate favorable terms from the
lenders they search. The relation between the search and negotiation processes might also
be emphasized. For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s “Owning a
Home” guide advises that “Your best bargaining chip is usually having Loan Estimates
from other lenders in hand.”1
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data and
establishes two patterns. First, consumers’ ability to recall their interest rate is a strong
predictor of paying a low rate and is associated with greater knowledge and attention as
shown by other survey responses. Yet interest rate recall is associated with only a slight
increase in the number of firms searched, suggesting that the difference in outcomes arises
instead from price discrimination or differences in negotiation effectiveness. Second, in-
creased reported search intensity is only weakly associated with paying a lower interest
rate.
Section 1.3 presents a structural model of search over price and unobserved nonprice
characteristics. I show that the simultaneous search model implies an implausibly weak
price preference. This paper therefore uses a sequential search model. In light of the
very weak association between search intensity and accepted interest rate, I assume that
all consumers (within a type) have the same search cost. Price dispersion in the model is
generated by dispersion in lender costs and the idiosyncratic nonprice utility of a firm to
different consumers.2
With one type of consumer the model is identified only up to the price disutility α.
I divide consumers into two types according to whether they recalled the interest rate. I
assume that firms may effectively make a different offer to each type, e.g. by leaving an
opening for negotiation that inattentive consumers do not exploit. The two consumer types
are assumed to differ only in their preferences and search behavior, with any differences in
the cost of lending accounted for by controls. These assumptions identify the full model.
Section 1.4 presents results. Relative to the 86 percent of consumers who do recall the
1https://www.consumerfinance.gov/owning-a-home/process/compare/
fine-tune-loan-offers/
2As shown by Diamond (1971), dispersion in firm costs alone would not be enough to generate price
dispersion in equilibrium.
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interest rate, non-recallers have less than half the price sensitivity and more than twice the
search cost in interest rate points. Part of this apparent difference in preferences may be due
to confusion among non-recallers about the market environment and a tendency to believe
that the rate offers they receive are the best available.
Section 1.5 decomposes the interest rate penalty for non-recallers. Of the recaller/non-
recaller difference in mean interest rate spread, 10 percent is a direct effect of preferences
and 90 percent is a price discrimination effect. This substantial price discrimination under-
scores the finding of Bhutta et al. (2018) that there is substantial interest rate dispersion in
mortgages within the same lender. Consumer conscientiousness and attention, as proxied
by interest rate recall, provide an explanation for why a lender might offer different prices
to different consumers.
Section 1.6 discusses some additional features of the mortgage market and their impli-
cations for the results. Several robustness checks are presented. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Data
This paper uses the National Survey of Mortgage Originations (NSMO) developed by Av-
ery et al. (2017). NSMO combines a survey of borrower characteristics and search intensity
with linked administrative data on lender identity and loan terms. While borrower charac-
teristics and outcomes have been observed separately in past data collection (Woodward
and Hall, 2012), the novelty of NSMO is that these variables are now linked in transaction-
level microdata, allowing the estimation of models with consumer heterogeneity such as
this paper and Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017). Consumer characteristics include self-
reported financial and demographic characteristics as well as self-reported familiarity with
various parts of the mortgage process. Consumers also report the number of lenders or
brokers they chose to “seriously consider.” The NSMO data collection is ongoing and the
data for this paper spans mortgage originations from 2013 through 2016.
Avery and Borzekowski (2019) introduce a volume of recent research using NSMO. In
this volume, Critchfield et al. (2019) find that borrowers in rural areas tend to pay higher
rates and to express less confidence about their knowledge of the mortgage process. For ex-
ample, 55 percent of borrowers in metro areas reported that they had been ”very familiar”
with the mortgage process when they began this process. Controlling for demographics,
borrowers in rural counties were 10 percentage points less likely to express such confi-
dence. I observe that only 83.6 percent of rural borrowers recalled their interest rate versus
86.5 percent of borrowers in a metro area, which may help to explain the higher rates
paid by rural borrowers. Other articles in this volume analyze borrowers’ expectations of
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changes in housing prices (Redmer, 2019), evaluate the impact of a disclosure intervention
on shopping behavior (Bucks et al., 2019) and evaluate differences in outcomes between
borrowers who took advantage of housing counseling and similar borrowers who did not
not (Argento et al., 2019). In a simple comparison of the 908 borrowers who underwent
housing counseling to all 14,057 who did not, I find no significant difference in interest rate
recall between the groups.
Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017) use a more detailed restricted version of the NSMO
data to evaluate the potential gains to consumers of searching more, as well as the effect
of brand preferences in causing consumers to accept higher-priced offers. The restricted
version of NSMO includes the identity of the lender, which is omitted from the public
use version to protect the confidentiality of survey respondents. The model I apply to the
public use data necessarily has a much less detailed treatment of non-price preferences.
The focus of Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017) is on the choice of how many and which
firms to search, while this paper focuses on consumer characteristics and the role of price
discrimination in explaining the large dispersion in prices.
Table 1.2 summarizes a few key variables in NSMO.3 The analysis sample is 30-year
fixed rate mortgages, which are 64 percent of all mortgages in the data. The loan term is
known from administrative data, but the identification of fixed versus adjustable rate mort-
gages relies on consumer survey responses. I discard both the 6.8 percent of consumers who
reported having an adjustable rate mortgage and the 2.6 percent who did not know whether
their rate was adjustable. The share of consumers reporting an adjustable rate mortgage in
the data is similar to shares of adjustable rate mortgages reported by the Mortgage Bankers
Association during this period.4
NSMO’s administrative data includes the rate spread on each sampled mortgage, de-
fined as the interest rate minus the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey average
rate on a loan of the same type (fixed or adjustable) and term. The rate spread is top-coded
at 1.5 percentage points, affecting 12 percent of consumers.5 Yet the top-coding at 1.5 in
NSMO is helpfully matched by bottom-coding at 1.5 in a separate federal dataset collected
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)6 Rate spreads in the HMDA data are
based on the federally defined Average Prime Offer Rate (APOR). However, PMMS is
the primary source used in constructing the APOR. The HMDA data uses the Annual Per-





5The data is also bottom-coded at -1.5 percentage points, affecting 0.2 percent of the sample.
6The HMDA data is available at https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/hmdaflat.htm.
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centage Rate (APR) which differs from the interest rate by including discount points and
fees.
I replace each top-coded spread in NSMO with a randomly selected spread between 1.5
and 3.7 from the 2016 HMDA data, where the upper bound of 3.7 was selected from the
HMDA data as the 90th percentile of spreads of 1.5 or more (or the 99.2 percentile of all
spreads). Observations are matched by whether the loan was for the purpose of refinancing,
by which government agency (if any) insured the loan, and within bins of loan amount and
income. This procedure helps to restore some of the variation in the data removed by top-
coding. The drawbacks of this procedure are (1) the excess of rate spread over 1.5 is not
linked to the full set of consumer characteristics and (2) the distribution of APR is used to
replace part of the distribution of interest rate despite differences between the two rates.
There is a great deal of variation in the rate spread, with a standard deviation of 0.65 per-
centage points (or 0.56 percentage points if top-coded rate spreads are left as 1.5 percentage
points). The rate spread depends to some extent on borrower and loan characteristics di-
rectly related to the cost and risk of lending. These include the borrower’s credit score, the
loan amount, the loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, and whether the loan is insured
by by a government agency such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). I regress
the rate spread on these credit characteristics.7 The residual from this regression represents
a cost-adjusted rate spread that attempts to exclude the interest rate effects of borrower-
level variation in creditworthiness. Table 1.2 shows both the raw and adjusted rate spreads,
with the calculation of the adjusted rate spread detailed in Appendix Table 1.A1. The R2
from adjusting the rate spread is 0.07, indicating that most price differences in this market
are not explained by the main measures of creditworthiness used by lenders.
While most consumers find a mortgage directly through a bank or other lender, 41 per-
cent of consumers used a mortgage broker. Mortgage brokers are independent agents who
assist the consumer in searching multiple lenders. During the 2013-2016 data period there
was a significant change in the regulatory environment for brokers. The Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) Loan Originator Compensation rule was implemented,
prohibiting payments by lenders to brokers in exchange for steering consumers to the
lender’s products. The rule was formally issued on January 20, 2013 and implemented
January 10, 2014.
As shown in Table 1.2, consumers who ultimately accepted an offer through a broker
searched only somewhat less than consumers who accepted an offer directly. This suggests
that even with a broker, deliberate search may be necessary to find the best mortgage.
7In this linear regression, I account for top-coding using a Tobit model rather than by the replacement
procedure outlined above.
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Used broker Non-recallers Recallers Difference
2013 1.09 0.30 0.79
2014-2016 1.36 0.28 1.08
Change 0.27 -0.01 0.29
No broker Non-recallers Recallers Difference
2013 1.07 0.21 0.87
2014-2016 1.22 0.20 1.02
Change 0.15 0.00 0.15
Table 1.1: Mean cost-adjusted interest rate spread, by loan origination year and by whether
the consumer used a mortgage broker in his shopping process. The CFPB Loan Originator
Compensation Rule was implemented on January 10, 2014.
Consumers who used a broker tended to pay more than consumers who did not, which can
be explained by less qualified consumers being more likely to need a broker’s assistance
in finding a loan. Among respondents who used a broker, the mean credit score was 724
compared to 733 for respondents who did not use a broker, a difference of 0.14 standard
deviations.
The results of this paper are similar whether the analysis sample includes all brokered
and unbrokered transactions (the main analysis), unbrokered transactions only, brokered
transactions in 2013 (before the CFPB rule went into effect), or brokered transactions in
2014-2016. In particular, Table 1.1 shows no evidence that consumers using brokers were
less likely to receive high rate spreads after the rule went into effect, or that the link between
interest rate non-recall and the rate spread was weakened after the rule implementation.
An important limitation of NSMO and of many but not all other mortgage datasets is the
omission of “discount points”, which are upfront fees paid by the borrower in exchange for
a lower interest rate. One discount point costs 1 percent of the loan amount and reduces the
interest rate by some amount determined by the lender. Consumers may also pay negative
discount points, increasing the interest rate in return for cash to pay closing costs. Bhutta
and Hizmo (2019) find that an apparent tendency for racial minorities to pay higher interest
rates is in fact fully explained by white borrowers paying more discount points. If some low
interest rates in NSMO are in fact due to consumers paying points, this paper will tend to
overestimate the benefit and cost of search and to underestimate price sensitivity. Similarly,
the difference in interest rate outcomes between the consumer types discussed in the next
section might be either attenuated or exacerbated by accounting for discount points. Bhutta
et al. (2018) show however that points cannot explain much of the variation in mortgage
outcomes. They find that adding discount points to a regression for rate spread reduces the
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Independent search Used broker Total
Share of sample 0.590 0.410 1.000
Rate spread 0.379 0.456 0.411
(0.716) (0.735) (0.725)
Rate spread, adj. for characteristics 0.345 0.435 0.382
(0.677) (0.698) (0.687)
# Lenders/brokers considered 1.735 1.640 1.696
(0.850) (0.794) (0.829)
# Lenders/brokers applied to 1.276 1.289 1.281
(0.572) (0.606) (0.586)
N 8,794 6,171 14,965
Table 1.2: Summary of the NSMO data. Standard deviations in parentheses. Observations
are weighted to account for sampling design and survey non-response.
10th to 90th percentile range only from 0.60 to 0.54 percentage points.8 The lowest rates
in the data are likely to be especially contaminated by points paid. Section 1.3.2 discusses
the treatment of outliers in the estimation.
The public version of the NSMO data omits data on lender identity. Alexandrov and
Koulayev (2017) use NSMO with lender identity data to show that lenders differ substan-
tially in their non-price quality. While I allow for nonprice variation in the quality of offers,
the absence of lender identity prevents decomposing nonprice quality into a lender compo-
nent and an idiosyncratic component as Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017) do.
Another lender-level feature of the mortgage market not modeled here is the incum-
bency advantage. Allen et al. (2014) and Allen et al. (2019) incorporate lender identity
into a model of the (Canadian) mortgage market. In both papers the researchers observe
the consumer’s “home bank”, i.e. the bank at which the consumer already has an account.
Consumers begin by searching the home bank at a cost of zero and search other banks
only if the home bank’s offer is unsatisfactory. In Allen et al. (2014) the home bank is
assumed to know the consumer’s preferences, allowing the bank to make a just-acceptable
initial offer to each of its existing customers. In Allen et al. (2019) the bank does not know
consumer preferences. Dispersion in the distribution of search costs thus causes some con-
sumers to reject the home bank’s initial offer in favor of search. In this case the home bank
may still win the consumer’s business with a new offer, but this offer must now compete
8The 10th to 90th percentile range for my analysis sample is much wider at 1.6 pp since it does not
incorporate lender fixed effects.
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with offers from other searched firms. The model explains the tendency of banks with large
retail market shares to offer less favorable rates to all customers, as well as the tendency of
banks to price discriminate against their existing customers.
This paper presents a model with similar implications. Lenders price discriminate
against consumers who appear less likely to search. However, this classification of con-
sumers is made based on consumer inattention rather than loyalty. Given their higher search
costs and lower price sensitivity, inattentive consumers have in a sense an indiscriminate
loyalty to whatever high-priced offer is currently on the table. As in Allen et al. (2019),
firms use this loyalty to extract a higher price.
1.2.1 Interest rate recall
The cost-adjusted rate spread has a standard deviation of 0.62 percentage points. For con-
text, a fairly typical mortgage during this period was a 30-year fixed rate loan of $300,000
at a 4 percent APR. A loan one standard deviation above this APR at 4.65 percent would
have a monthly payment of $1,547 instead of $1,432 and would cost fully $41,000 more
over the 30-year term of the loan.
A first step toward identifying the causes of price dispersion is to search for some re-
lation between the (unadjusted) rate spread and the approximately 400 survey and admin-
istrative variables reported in NSMO. With many potential explanatory variables and no
theoretical basis for a specific functional form, I draw from the machine learning literature
and fit a random forest model. The random forest model allows a convenient calculation
of each variable’s importance, defined as the increase in mean squared error caused by
dropping the variable from the model. Appendix Table 1.A2 reviews the top 25 variables
by importance. One variable is over 9 times as important as any other and accounts for
over 40 percent of total variable importance. This variable is an indicator for whether the
consumer responded to the question “What is the interest rate on this mortgage” by filling
a a supplied blank space with a number, as opposed to leaving the field blank or checking
a separate box for “Don’t know”. Neither the actual numerical response nor its correctness
is available in the data. Recall of the interest rate is thus imperfectly measured.
Given the random forest results, I classify consumers into the two discrete types of
interest rate recallers and non-recallers. This discrete type definition allows for convenient
estimation of the structural model. Moreover, interest rate recall seems unlikely to be
strongly related to the cost of lending after controlling for industry standard measures of
creditworthiness. The same cannot be said for some other consumer characteristics, such
as the consumer’s self-reported initial level of concern about qualifying for a mortgage.
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Figure 1.1: Density of cost-adjusted interest rate spreads paid, by whether the consumer
recalled an interest rate on the survey (not necessarily the correct rate).
The 13.8 percent of consumers who were interest rate non-recallers paid substantially
higher rate spreads, as shown in Table 1.3 and Figure 1.1. Compared to recallers, non-
recallers were also less likely to have a firm idea of the mortgage they wanted and were
more likely to choose a lender before choosing a loan type. Non-recallers did engage
in slightly less search as measured by the number of firms seriously considered, but this
difference is small relative to the difference in rate spread. Moreover, the next subsection
will show that differences in the number of firms considered are not associated with large
differences in rate spread.
One might argue that interest rate non-recall is a response to a high rate spread rather
than a cause of it. Consumers who accepted a very high rate may have discovered their
mistake by the time they complete the survey, in which case social desirability bias could
motivate leaving the question blank or marking “Don’t know”. However, non-recallers also
tend to report lower familiarity with all aspects of the market at the time they “began the
process of getting this mortgage”. Non-recallers were also less likely to recall other key
loan characteristics such as the presence of a prepayment penalty or interest-only payments.
These correlations suggest that interest rate non-recall is, at least for some consumers, part
of an overall pattern of behavior. In addition, Table 1.A2 shows that other recall items
such as recall of the monthly payment and amount borrowed were also associated with the
interest rate spread. As with recall of the interest rate, consumers who recalled these items
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Non-recaller mean Recaller mean p-value Overall mean
Rate spread 1.208 0.166 0.000 0.309
(std. dev.) (0.807) (0.481) (0.725)
Cost-adjusted rate spread 1.250 0.244 0.000 0.382
(std. dev.) (0.792) (0.440) (0.688)
Initially very familiar with rates 0.503 0.617 0.000 0.601
...with loan types available 0.396 0.475 0.000 0.464
Initially very familiar with process 0.487 0.522 0.005 0.518
Initial firm idea of loan wanted 0.538 0.605 0.000 0.596
Picked lender before loan type 0.733 0.685 0.000 0.692
# lenders/brokers applied to 1.241 1.317 0.000 1.307
(std. dev.) (0.557) (0.592) (0.586)
...seriously considered 1.610 1.730 0.000 1.714
(std. dev.) (0.799) (0.834) (0.829)
Loan purpose was refinance 0.407 0.414 0.571 0.413
Loan was through a broker 0.406 0.415 0.497 0.414
Recall: Had prepayment penalty 0.796 0.864 0.000 0.854
Recall: Balloon payment 0.819 0.881 0.000 0.872
Recall: Interest-only payments 0.798 0.873 0.000 0.863
Low APR very important (7,126) 0.784 0.808 0.083 0.805
Recalled closing costs (7,126) 0.126 0.458 0.000 0.416
Loan amount (approximate) 206.397 233.358 0.000 229.639
(std. dev.) (119.6) (130.9) (129.8)
Respondent non-Hispanic white 0.800 0.775 0.014 0.779
...non-Hispanic black 0.058 0.050 0.141 0.051
...non-Hispanic Asian 0.031 0.053 0.000 0.050
...non-Hispanic other race 0.027 0.027 0.945 0.027
...Hispanic 0.083 0.095 0.123 0.093
...female 0.514 0.428 0.000 0.440
Multiple borrowers 0.468 0.464 0.740 0.465
Observations 2,394 12,571 14,965
Table 1.3: Summary statistics by whether the consumer recalled an interest rate (not neces-
sarily the correct rate). The p-values are for a t-test of whether non-recallers and recallers
have the same mean. Some questions were only asked in certain survey waves, in which




Another predictor of paying a high interest rate may be failure to return the survey.
The NSMO public file includes only consumers who returned the survey and assigns each
consumer an analysis weight to account for the sampling rate of each wave and for non-
response. One of the “key predictive variables” in the non-response adjustment is the rate
spread, and indeed a rate spread of 1.5 percentage points or more is associated with a 36
percent higher analysis weight. The NSMO public file does not include actual records for
non-responders, and naturally the survey variables such as number of firms considered will
be unknown for this group. For these reasons I do not include an indicator for survey re-
sponse in the analysis. However, the association between survey non-response and high
rate spreads provides additional evidence that the consumer’s underlying level of conscien-
tiousness affects his or her success in the market.
Table 1.3 also tabulates the respondent’s race and gender by interest rate recall. Several
papers have investigated the possibility of race or gender discrimination in the mortgage
market. Bartlett et al. (2018) finds that black and Hispanic borrowers pay a small interest
rate penalty of 0.06-0.09 percentage points after controlling for creditworthiness and loan
characteristics. However, Bhutta and Hizmo (2019) find that these racial disparities are ex-
plained by white borrowers choosing to pay more discount points. Using data on subprime
mortgages, Fang and Munneke (2017) find that female sole borrowers pay an interest rate
0.13 percentage points higher than joint male and female borrowers, even after controlling
for the higher loan termination risk of female sole borrowers.
Table 1.3 shows that survey respondents who do not recall the interest rate are not sig-
nificantly more likely to be black or Hispanic but are significantly more likely to be female.
Table 1.4 further shows that women are less likely to recall the interest rate regardless of
whether they were responding for a household of multiple borrowers or for themselves
only. These findings suggest that the gender disparity found by Fang and Munneke (2017)
may be caused by statistical discrimination against less attentive consumers. In this pa-
per’s data, loans with a female respondent have an increased cost-adjusted rate spread of
0.05 percentage points, as shown in Tables 1.5 (for sole borrowers) and 1.6 (for women
responding on behalf of multiple borrowers). Column (2) of these tables shows that the
gender disparity becomes statistically insignificant once interest rate recall is controlled
for.
Interestingly, Table 1.6 shows that the disparity against female respondents persists
when there are multiple borrowers–in most cases, a male-female couple. One explanation
is that women who respond to the survey on behalf of a couple or family likely took the
lead in mortgage negotiations, incurring roughly the same penalty as female sole borrowers.
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Higher interest rates thus apply to women as negotiators rather than as borrowers.
Since attention as measured by interest rate recall is correlated with gender, the simple
discriminatory strategy of charging higher rates to inattentive consumers would have a
disparate impact and may be prohibited by law. However, firms could modify this strategy
to include some compensating discrimination in favor of women. Absent a race or gender
element, charging higher prices to inattentive consumers is legally permitted.
Moreover, discrimination by consumer attentiveness does not necessarily require a
lender to “size up” each consumer for an individually tailored offer. Discrimination could
be implemented simply by leaving an opening for negotiation that inattentive consumers
might not exploit.9 The structural model of Section 1.3 assumes that lenders may price dis-
criminate by consumer attentiveness as represented by interest rate recall, but cannot price
discriminate by any other consumer characteristic.
Male Female
One borrower 0.123 0.157
Multiple borrowers 0.115 0.165
Table 1.4: Share of survey respondents who do not recall the interest rate, by respondent
gender and whether there were multiple borrowers on the mortgage.
1.2.2 Data on search intensity
The structural model of Section 1.3 requires data on the number of firms a consumer
searched. NSMO asks the consumer “How many different lenders/mortgage brokers did
you seriously consider before choosing where to apply for this mortgage?”, and subse-
quently how many lenders/brokers the consumer actually applied to. According to their
self-reporting, 48 percent of consumers seriously considered only one firm, 35 percent
considered two, and 16 percent considered three or more. This finding is consistent with
past survey evidence. Cai and Shahdad (2015) find that 35 percent of consumers obtain
only one mortgage quote. Woodward and Hall (2012) cite surveys showing that the modal
number of loans considered was two (Lacko and Pappalardo, 1991) and that more than half
of borrowers considered only one loan (Federal Reserve Board, 2009), which reinforces
their structural estimate of a common search intensity of two.
9Some states impose a fiduciary duty on mortgage brokers, though not on mortgage lenders. Fiduciary
duties require the broker to seek the best loan for the borrower and thus lessen the opportunity for any sort
of discrimination. In addition, the CFPB Loan Originator Compensation rule that took effect during the
data period further limited the scope of broker price discrimination by preventing lenders from compensating
brokers who steer business to the lender.
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(1) (2)
Cost-adjusted rate spread Cost-adjusted rate spread
Respondent is non-Hispanic black 0.0457 0.0636
(0.0512) (0.0438)
Respondent is non-Hispanic Asian -0.0284 -0.0440
(0.104) (0.0893)
Respondent is Hispanic 0.0970∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.0439) (0.0376)
Other race -0.133 -0.0425
(0.0898) (0.0770)
Respondent is female 0.0515 0.0177
(0.0331) (0.0284)





Adjusted R2 0.004 0.269
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.5: Regression of the cost-adjusted rate spread on demographic characteristics of
the respondent. Sample: Loans with only one borrower.
16
(1) (2)
Cost-adjusted rate spread Cost-adjusted rate spread
Respondent is non-Hispanic black -0.0578 -0.00900
(0.0985) (0.0842)
Respondent is non-Hispanic Asian -0.240 -0.142
(0.129) (0.110)
Respondent is Hispanic 0.00792 0.0606
(0.0591) (0.0506)
Other race 0.0557 0.0252
(0.153) (0.131)
Respondent is female 0.0256 -0.0122
(0.0411) (0.0352)





Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.270
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.6: Regression of the cost-adjusted rate spread on demographic characteristics of
the respondent. Sample: Loans with more than one borrower.
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This paper labels as search intensity the number of firms seriously considered, whose
mean of 1.71 is consistent with the surveys cited above. Two possible types of error may
arise. First, there may be substantial noise in the reported number of firms seriously con-
sidered, including noise caused by different interpretations of the survey question. I discuss
the implications of these idiosyncratic errors for a simultaneous search model in subsection
1.3.1. However, idiosyncratic errors will not affect the sequential search model at the cen-
ter of this paper, under which the rate spread is not correlated with the search intensity of
the individual consumer (as opposed to the consumer’s type). A greater concern is system-
atic error. Search intensity may not be an appropriate proxy for the full array of consumer
search behavior. Consumers may have a great deal of information on other firms without
going so far as to seriously consider them. As Deltas and Li (2018) note for their measure
of search in the mortgage market (the loan application to loan origination ratio), search
intensity is “a proxy for less formal rate queries and other information acquisition efforts.”
As do Woodward and Hall (2012), this paper finds that using consumer-reported search
intensity as the model’s formal search intensity leads to reasonable structural estimates.
I also follow Woodward and Hall (2012) in presenting results under alternative values of
search intensity as discussed in section 1.6.
Table 1.7 regresses the cost-adjusted interest rate on indicators for the number of firms
seriously considered. Consumers who consider multiple firms do obtain lower rate spreads,
but the effect is less than 0.03 percentage points.
1.3 Model
Each consumer has a type: whether or not the consumer was among the “attentive” 86
percent of consumers who recalled an interest rate when prompted. I assume that this type
is observable to firms. If consumer i of type m accepts the offer of firm j and searches nim
times, his utility is
uim = vijm − cmnim (1.1)
where
vijm = −αmpjm + εijm (1.2)




















Adjusted R2 0.004 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.7: Regression of cost-adjusted rate spread on the number of lenders seriously con-
sidered. Column (1) includes only consumers who did not recall their interest rate, column
(2) includes only those who did.
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an idiosyncratic nonprice utility εij ∼ Gumbel(0, 1) iid. Note that there is no consumer
subscript on the search cost cm. Past work that has identified a full distribution of search
costs (Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004) has typically had access to additional data such as
firm identities and the distribution of offered prices (as opposed to accepted prices).
The price pjm is operationalized as the cost-adjusted rate spread. If firm j has cost rjm
of serving a consumer of type m, it will set its price pjm to type m consumers to maximize
max
pjm
Pr(i accepts pjm)(pjm − rjm) (1.3)
.
I assume that before they search, consumers know the distribution of vijm for offers to
their type but have no information on the vijm they would receive from any particular firm.
Consumers thus engage in undirected search and all consumers draw firms from the same
sampling process. I defer until subsection 1.3.1 determining whether search is sequential
or simultaneous.
I assume that εijm is independent of the firm’s cost rjm and is unobserved by the firm.
This makes εijm independent of the offered price pjm. The assumptions on ε are not testable
in this data, though some potential biases can be qualified. To the extent that firms with
high costs and high rate offers provide better service with higher nonprice quality, observed
consumer behavior will be as if α were smaller than its true value. To the extent that firms
observe their match value εijm and tailor their price offers by charging more when εijm
is high, observed consumer behavior will again be as if α were smaller than its true value.
However, it is difficult to qualify the overall effect of these potential biases on the sequential
search model estimation of Subsection 1.3.2.
In the final stage of the sequential search estimation, I assume that both consumer types
face the same distribution of firm costs (F rO0 = F
rO
1 ). Estimation involves choosing the
model parameters to equate these distributions as closely as possible. Recall that prices
and firm costs are in terms of the interest rate spread adjusted for conventionally measured
creditworthiness in Table 1.A1. The assumption F rO0 = F
rO
1 thus rules out only cost
differences not explained by differences in credit score, income, or other standard credit
covariates.
Nonetheless, the assumption does rule out an facially plausible alternative explanation
of the high rate spreads paid by non-recallers. Instead of price discriminating, firms may
simply face a higher credit risk in lending to non-recallers and may pass this cost through in
the form of higher rate spreads. Section 1.6 presents evidence against this cost passthrough
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story. In particular, the interest rate disparity between recallers and non-recallers persists
in the market for FHA-insured mortgages where the government bears all credit risk.
1.3.1 Simultaneous search implies implausibly weak price preferences
Consumers may choose in advance how many firms to search (simultaneous search) or may
decide after each search whether to continue searching (sequential search). Which search
model is more appropriate will depend on the market in question. For example, Moraga-
Gonza´lez et al. (2015) argue that search in the Dutch automobile market is simultaneous
given the need to arrange test drives in advance. Honka and Chintagunta (2017) formally
estimate which model of search applies to the US auto insurance industry and find evidence
for simultaneous search. In the mortgage market Woodward and Hall (2012) adopt simul-
taneous search while Deltas and Li (2018) are agnostic about whether search is sequential,
simultaneous, or a process that combines elements of both. This section discusses the data
patterns that suggest sequential search as the more plausible data generating process for the
NSMO data.
Simultaneous search implies a rigid relationship between search intensity and the price
paid, which can be simulated. Consider for now only the more numerous of the two con-
sumer types, those who recall interest rates. Of these consumers, 47 percent searched once
and 36 percent searched twice. Recall that conditional on consumer type, all consumers are
assumed to draw from the same distribution of offered prices. Under simultaneous search
this offer distribution can be directly observed as the distribution of accepted prices for
ni = 1. Given this offer distribution, a simulation exercise finds the unique value of price
sensitivity α that explains the observed mean price paid by ni = 2 consumers of the same
consumer type.
The simulation procedure is presented in detail in Appendix 1.A. The resulting estimate
is αm = 0.21 for recallers, implying that one standard deviation of offered price has the
same value as 0.070 standard deviations of the Gumbel(0, 1) offered non-price utility.10
This is an implausibly low utility value for nearly half a percentage point of rate spread.
Further, 80 percent of consumers who applied to more than one lender reported “searching
for better loan terms” as one of their reasons for doing so, which is inconsistent with search
being mainly for nonprice characteristics.
A separate reason to avoid a simultaneous search model stems from the supply side
and the substantial share of consumers who search only once. If almost half of consumers
10Repeating this exercise for non-recallers gives αm = 0.12, implying that one standard deviation of
the non-recaller offered price distribution has the same utility value as 0.073 standard deviations of offered
non-price utility.
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really are precommitted to searching only one firm then a firm’s optimal offer may be an
extremely high interest rate that sets consumer surplus to zero. Since this is of course not
the market reality, firms must believe that their consumers could search elsewhere even if
they do not. This belief is the basis of the sequential search model.11
1.3.2 Estimating the sequential search model
Given the evidence in the previous subsection, I assume that search is sequential. This sec-
tion presents the estimation method in three stages. The first two stages consider only one
consumer type (recallers or non-recallers). First, accepted prices and the average number
of firms searched are used to estimate wm conditional on an assumed value of αm. Sec-
ond, αm and wm together are used to estimate the firm cost corresponding to each accepted
price. I reweight the empirical cost distribution corresponding to accepted prices to find
its counterpart for offered prices. Together these two stages give one estimated firm cost
distribution F rO0 for each α0 in a given parameter range to explore, and similarly F
rO
0 for
each α1 in another range.
Third, I apply the assumption that firms can serve each consumer type at the same cost.
The cost distribution for each type’s offered prices should thus be the same. I search over
(α0, α1) and compare the cost distributions found by the first two stages. The pair (α0, α1)
with the most similar cost distributions is accepted as the estimate, from which the first two
estimation stages recover (w0, w1). The remainder of this subsection discusses each stage
in detail.
1.3.2.1 Stage 1: Estimate wm conditional on αm
The first stage estimates wm conditional on αm for a single type. All consumers within the
type have the same search cost and thus the same strategy, which is the reservation utility
rule of Weitzman (1979). A consumer of type m accepts any offer that yields utility of at




(x− wm)f vO(x;m)dx (1.4)
where f vO(·;m) is the density of offered utility to type m and fpO(·;m) will be used
11In their simultaneous search model Woodward and Hall (2012) must omit the option of searching only
once, for the same reason: “if the borrower continues to believe that there is, in effect, only one broker in the
universe, the broker can capture up to the total benefit to the borrower from buying any house.” (emphasis in
original)
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to represent the same for offered price.12 Since neither the offer distribution nor the con-
sumer’s decision rule depends on how many searches the consumer has already made, the
distribution of accepted price (or utility) is independent of ni. Recall from Table 1.7 that
while accepted prices in the data are decreasing in the number of searches, the relation is
very weak with only a 0.02 percentage point benefit for searching twice instead of once.
The probability that an offer is accepted is
Pr(accept|p,m) = Pr(−αmp+ εijm > wm) (1.7)
= Pr(εijm > wm + αmp) (1.8)
= 1− Fε(wm + αmp) (1.9)
The density of offered prices to consumer type m is not directly observed, but it can be
recovered conditional on αm from the consumer type’s density of accepted prices and and
their mean search intensity. Let pim be the accepted price for consumer i of type m. The
distribution of accepted price is given by




Pr(pjm < p, accept) (1.11)










Differentiate with respect to p, replacing E[nim|m] with its sample analogue nm and









Pr(pjm < x) (1.6)
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fpA(p;m) = nm(1− Fε(wm + αmp))fpO(p;m) (1.15)
fpO(p;m) =
fpA(p;m)
nm(1− Fε(wm + αmp)) (1.16)
.





nm1− Fε(wm + αmp)dp (1.17)
.







nm(1− Fε(w + αp)) (1.18)
where wtA are the survey weights reported in NSMO.
Fixing αm and wm allows evaluating the acceptance probability of Equation 1.9 and
thus evaluating the RHS of Equation 1.18. The RHS of 1.18 is decreasing in each price’s
acceptance probability, and each price’s acceptance probability is decreasing in αm and
wm. Equation 1.18 thus implicitly yields one of type m’s unknown parameters (suppose
αm) in terms of the other (wm).
1.3.2.2 Stage 2: Recover the firm cost distribution F rOm conditional on αm
The second estimation stage recovers the distribution of firm costs conditional on the de-
mand parameters αm and wm. Suppose firm j has cost rjm and encounters a consumer i
known to be of type m. The firm’s expected profit with price p is
piijm = (p− rjm)(1− Fε(wm + αmp)) (1.19)
.
The first order condition is
0 = (1− Fε(wm + αmp))− αm(p− rjm)fε(wm + αmp) (1.20)
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leading to the optimal markup
(p− rjm) = 1
αm




Equation 1.21 is used to recover the cost corresponding to each offer. To find the dis-
tribution of firm costs, I compute weights that account for the original NSMO sampling
and non-response weights as well as the average number of offers for each acceptance at a





1− Fε(wm + αmpjm) (1.22)
.
Weighting the estimated rjm by wtOijm gives a representative sample from the firm cost
distribution F rOm to consumer type m. With only one consumer type this would be as
far as the estimation strategy could go, providing only a set-identification result (which
Subsection 1.4.1 presents). The third estimation stage achieves full identification under the
additional assumption that the same firms serve two observably different consumer types,
who differ in their preferences but not in their distribution of cost of lending after adjusting
for conventionally measured creditworthiness.
1.3.2.3 Stage 3: Equate (approximately) F rO0 and F rO1
The third and final estimation stage seeks to make the firm cost distributions as similar as
possible across the two consumer types. I assume that once the interest rate is adjusted for
observable cost and risk factors in Section 1.2, interest rate recall is unrelated to the cost of
lending. For each αm, I compute the implied wm for each consumer type using Equation
1.18. I use the markup rule 1.21 to recover firm costs and the reweighting 1.22 to estimate
the distribution of firm costs corresponding to offers. Finally, I use a grid search to select an
αm for each type that minimizes the distance between the two estimated cost distributions.
The cost distributions are compared using the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) of opti-
mal transport theory (Rubner et al., 1998). Intuitively, suppose that each cost distribution
is a collection of piles of dirt at the locations given by the estimated costs and with the
size of each pile given by the corresponding weight from Equation 1.22. The EMD is the
amount of work, in terms of mass times distance, required to transform one distribution into
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the other. Since the lowest rate spreads in NSMO would imply extremely low firm costs,
I limit sensitivity to outliers by omitting the bottom 25 percent of each cost distribution.
Appendix Table 1.A5 and Appendix Figure 1.A2 repeat the estimation dropping only the
bottom 10 percent of each cost distribution. The 25 percent drop was selected as the base
specification because its parameter estimates implied fewer implausibly low costs. The
lowest observed interest rates are likely explained by consumers paying discount points
unobserved in the data, as discussed in section 1.2.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Interest rate recallers only
Figure 1.2 shows the estimated price offer density in terms of the undetermined price coef-
ficient α, as well as the corresponding density of costs corresponding to these offers. Only
the 86 percent of consumers who recalled the interest rate are included.13 Consideration of
multiple consumer types is deferred to the next section.
At α = 0 consumers are indifferent to price and the price offer density is identical to
the density of accepted prices. Repeated search is only for the purpose of finding a better
non-price utility. At the other extreme a high α of 2 or 3 implies that there are many
offers at very high prices. Intuitively, a high price sensitivity implies a low probability of
accepting a high price, which means that the few accepted high prices are a small fraction
of a multitude of high price offers.
13Appendix Figure 1.A1 presents the price offer and cost densities for non-recallers.
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Figure 1.2: Possible probability densities of price offers and firm costs, based on data from
consumers who recalled the interest rate. Selecting the correct density requires identifying
the price disutility α using data from both consumer types. There is no cost density for
α = 0 because the optimal price to a completely price-insensitive consumer is infinite.
1.4.2 Full results using both consumer types
Consumers who did not recall their interest rate paid much higher cost-adjusted rate spreads
(1.34 versus 0.17 percentage points) and searched only slightly less, seriously considering
an average of 1.60 firms instead of 1.72. Sequential search does not impose a direct link
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Figure 1.3: Density of firm costs, corresponding to the offer distribution to each consumer
type.
between the number of searches and the price paid as would be seen with simultaneous
search. However, it is possible that the two types of consumers had different preferences
αm, wm and that this caused lenders and brokers to provide them with different price offer
distributions. This section presents estimates under the assumption that consumer types
may differ in preferences but not in the costs of the firms they searched.
Table 1.8 presents the estimation results and Figure 1.3 shows the implied cost densities.
Recallers are much more price sensitive by any metric. They have higher αm, a higher ratio
of the utility value of one standard deviation of searched price to the utility value of one
standard deviation of searched nonprice utility ε, and a lower price threshold at which the
probability of accepting an offer equals 1
2
. Figure 1.3 shows that the cost densities are only
a rough match at the estimated parameters, which shows that there is some misspecification
in this model. In particular the non-recaller cost density is has more mass at the extremes
than the recaller cost density. This suggests that the tendency of some non-recallers to re-
ceive extremely high offers cannot be fully explained by all non-recallers having uniformly
different tastes or higher search costs. A model with heterogeneity in search costs within a
type might reduce the misspecification but may also be more difficult to estimate reliably.
While the estimation strategy in general does not guarantee a unique distance-minimizing
(α0, α1), identification is clear with the current data. Figure 1.5 shows that the EMD objec-
tive descends monotonically toward a unique minimum and that there are no near-minima













∆u(1 std. dev. accepted price)
∆u(1 std. dev.ε) 0.45 0.53
(0.03) (0.09)
Price such that Pr(accept) = 0.5 1.96 0.59
(0.13) (0.04)
Q1 of firm cost distribution FOrg -2.19 -1.33
(0.1) (0.09)
Q2 of firm cost distribution FOrg -0.7 -0.74
(0.12) (0.12)
Q3 of firm cost distribution FOrg -0.07 -0.11
(0.11) (0.09)
IQR of firm cost distribution FOrg 2.12 1.22
(0.03) (0.01)
Table 1.8: Demand estimates: αm for recallers and non-recallers, the implied value of the
reservation price parameter w, and selected other statistics. The parameters αm were cho-
sen to minimize the Earth Mover’s distance between recaller and non-recaller cost densities.
Standard errors (in parentheses) generated by 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 1.4: Density of price offers, by consumer type. The solid line shows the offer
distribution that non-recallers would have faced if their distribution of lending costs had
been exactly that of recallers rather than approximately the same as in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.5: Earth Mover’s Distance as a function of the price sensitivities α0, α1 of non-
recallers and recallers respectively. For visualization, the distance is top-coded at 1.
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1.5 Counterfactuals
Consumers who do not recall their interest rate pay a large penalty in risk-adjusted rate
spread: 1.01 percentage points. This paper’s structural model allows a decomposition of
this penalty by its several causes, as shown in Table 1.9. First, non-recallers would pay
0.24 percentage points less solely due to having a slightly lower distribution of lending
costs than recallers. Since the estimation strategy is based on matching the two lending
cost distributions, this discrepancy represents the degree to which the model fails to fit the
data. Possible causes include unobserved differences between the two consumer types such
as patterns of discount points paid. With the lending cost distribution for non-recallers held
fixed at that of recallers, the disparity to be explained grows to 1.25 percentage points. This
is the difference between the (actual) mean price of 0.24 for recallers and the (hypothetical)
mean price of 1.49 for non-recallers with the same cost of lending distribution as recallers.
To decompose this disparity, first suppose that an individual non-recaller had the pref-
erences and search behavior of a recaller while continuing to face price discrimination.
Such a consumer would pay a mean price of 1.34, as shown in the last row of Table 1.9.
Thus 0.15 percentage points (1.49 minus 1.34) of the non-recaller difference is attributable
directly to differences in behavior. Next make the opposite assumption that an individual
non-recaller managed to pose as a recaller and avoid price discrimination. The consumer
continues to search and choose according to non-recaller preferences. Such a consumer
pays a mean price of 0.37, as shown in the second-to-last row of the table. Therefore the
disparity attributable to price discrimination is 1.49 minus 0.37, or 1.12 percentage points.
The remaining 0.02 percentage points of the disparity is an interaction between differences
in the preferences of the two types and differences in their offer distributions.
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Non-recaller preferences with predicted non-recaller offers 1.46 1.59
Non-recaller preferences with recaller offers 0.36 1.56
Recaller preferences with predicted non-recaller offers 1.31 1.84
Table 1.9: Results of counterfactually altering preferences and offers. “Predicted non-
recaller offers” in the third row are those that would be made by price-discriminating firms
to non-recallers if the cost of lending were exactly as for recallers rather than just approxi-
mately the same.
The large price discrimination effect reflects the very different optimal markups to the
two consumer types. Figure 1.6 shows the result of solving for the optimal markup to each
type using Equation 1.21. For both consumer types, markups are largest when costs are
low. The markup is always higher for non-recallers, with the largest disparity occurring
at moderate to high costs. Referring to Figure 1.4, this difference in markups causes non-
recallers to often face high offers that would be very rare for recallers.
The counterfactual results are largely unaffected by whether the data includes trans-
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actions with or without brokers, before or after the CFPB Loan Originator Compensation
rule implementation. An open question is why using a broker offers no protection against
the negative effects of interest rate non-recall. Given the CFPB rule, brokers differ from
lenders in that they have no incentive to deliberately offer worse rates to less attentive or
conscientious consumers. One possibility is that brokers take consumer preferences into
account when searching on their behalf, and the preferences of non-recallers are relatively
price-insensitive. Alternatively some level of attention may be required of the consumer
even when assisted by a broker.
1.6 Features of the mortgage market and robustness
This section pauses to consider several possible features of the mortgage market that could
affect this paper’s results. First, consumer search attempts may be undercounted. The
definition of search most appropriate to an economic model may not be the same as the
definition of search as number of lenders “seriously consider[ed]”. A consumer may have
some level of knowledge about a firm and its offers from viewing advertising or from some
form of casual search not rising to the point of serious consideration.
The estimation results in Appendix Tables 1.A3 and 1.A4 are analogous to Tables 1.8
and 1.9 but with search intensity doubled for all consumers. While the results are numer-
ically quite different, the same qualitative conclusions apply. Results appear to depend on
the small size of the recaller/non-recaller difference in search intensity rather than on the
overall level of search in the market.
A second and opposite possibility is that search attempts are overcounted, particularly
for the least creditworthy borrowers. Agarwal et al. (2017) show that consumers who search
more actually pay higher rates, counter to the prediction of a standard search model. In their
model this pattern is explained by the presence of differences in consumer creditworthiness.
Less creditworthy consumers will receive higher rate offers and must search more to find
a lender willing to accept them. To address this concern, Appendix Table 1.A6 repeats the
analysis for the most creditworthy borrowers only and finds similar results.
Perhaps the most important fact of the mortgage market not captured in this paper’s data
is the presence of discount points. Bhutta and Hizmo (2019) analyze data on points and
interest rate spreads for FHA-insured loans. The mean number of points paid was negative,
meaning that consumers were accepting higher interest rates in exchange for cash to pay
closing costs. Consumers who accepted higher rate spreads received on average some
compensation in the form of extra points. A consumer in the tenth decile of rate spread
received on average 1.63 more points than a consumer in the first decile while paying about
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an interest rate about 1.1 percentage points higher.
Receiving extra points dampens the negative impact of paying a high interest rate. How-
ever, this compensation is far from complete. Continuing with the example of a 30-year
fixed rate mortgage of $300,000, suppose that the market average interest rate was 4 per-
cent. The results of Bhutta and Hizmo (2019) suggest that a consumer in the tenth decile
of rate spread would pay an interest rate around 4.8 percent compared to 3.7 percent for a
consumer in the first decile. The high interest rate borrower would have a monthly payment
of $1,574 versus $1,381 for the low interest rate borrower, an excess of $193 per month.
After 26 months the higher payment would have wiped out the initial points received, with
almost 28 years of higher payments remaining on the mortgage. For a borrower discounting
at 4 percent annually, the difference in present value of the two monthly payment streams
is approximately $40,000 in favor of the low interest rate. Even for a borrower discounting
rapidly at 12 percent annually, the difference is approximately $19,000. Despite receiving
$4,890 worth of points, the high interest rate borrower is far worse off–unless perhaps he
refinances quickly into a lower interest rate mortgage. Although there are no prepayment
penalties in the FHA market studied by Bhutta and Hizmo (2019), closing costs for a refi-
nance are typically around 1.5 percent of the loan amount and would thus eliminate most
or all of the benefit of receiving points on the first loan.
These calculations suggest that much price dispersion remains after accounting for
points, and that this paper’s exclusive focus on interest rates does not grossly overstate
price dispersion. The structural estimation tends to discard those consumers who paid the
most points by excluding from the distance calculation the bottom 25 percent of the lending
cost distribution for each consumer type.
On the other hand, Bhutta and Hizmo (2019) use secondary market data to show that
high interest rate loans are not more profitable for the lender. This presents a puzzle:
the rate-points tradeoff is immaterial for the lender but appears very consequential for the
consumer. In the extreme case that points do fully compensate the consumer for interest rate
changes, this paper in effect shows a tendency of inattentive consumers to pay higher rates
versus higher points. The result would not rule out dispersion in the overall price of loans,
but would be unrelated to such dispersion. Data that combines consumer characteristics,
interest rates, and points paid would be useful for investigating this issue.
1.6.1 Loan performance and FHA insurance
Another reason why non-recallers pay more may be a higher default or prepayment risk.
A lender charging high rates to non-recallers may simply be passing through the higher
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cost of lending rather than engaging in price discrimination. The loan performance data in
NSMO allows for a limited test of this explanation. Indicators for delinquency or default
are observed for one month in each quarter from the date of the loan through the end of my
data period in June 2018. Each loan thus has at least 18 months of performance data.
Central to any assessment of a lender’s risk is whether the loan is insured by the gov-
ernment. In the case of a loan insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) the
government rather than the lender bears the risk of default in order to encourage the lender
to offer mortgages to certain higher-risk borrowers. 14 Tables 1.10 and 1.11 show that
both for “conventional” loans without a government guarantee and for FHA-insured loans,
non-recall of the interest rate is associated with roughly a doubling of the delinquency and
serious delinquency rates. Table 1.12 shows that the interest rate penalty for non-recall is
similar for FHA and conventional loans.
While the higher delinquency and default rates for non-recallers are consistent with
lenders passing through higher costs, the result of Table 1.12 is not. If the interest rate
penalty for non-recall were due to the passthrough of credit risk then one would expect to
see no interest rate penalty for non-recall in the FHA market, where risk is borne by the
government. Instead the penalty is of similar size in both markets. On the other hand,
price discrimination by search intensity is an explanation equally applicable to both the
conventional and FHA markets and is consistent with the similar patterns observed in the
two markets.
14In the event of foreclosure on a conventional loan, the lender takes possession of the property. If instead
the loan is FHA-insured, the government takes possession of the property and pays the lender the entire
remaining amount owed on the loan. The FHA’s assumption of all default risk for these loans is key to the




ever delin ever 90 delin ever default
Recalled interest rate -0.371 -0.293 -2.800∗∗
(0.283) (0.612) (1.051)
Adjusted rate spread -0.0189 -0.315 -0.619∗
(0.156) (0.315) (0.298)
Predicted rate spread 4.464∗∗∗
(1.048)
Creditworthiness controls Yes Yes No
Observations 10365 8272 10365
Pseudo R2 0.226 0.302 0.145
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
FHA:
(1) (2) (3)
ever delin ever 90 delin ever default
Recalled interest rate -0.853∗∗∗ -1.029∗ -1.924∗
(0.259) (0.416) (0.980)
Adjusted rate spread -0.224 -0.342 -1.232∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.239) (0.372)
Predicted rate spread 2.771
(1.526)
Creditworthiness controls Yes Yes No
Observations 2464 2464 2483
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.187 0.066
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.10: Regression of delinquency or default on rate recall and the cost-adjusted rate
spread. The dependent variables are indicators for ever having any delinquency on the loan,










ever delin 0.0303 0.0157 0.141 0.0774
ever 90 delin 0.00655 0.00386 0.0539 0.0271
ever fail 0.00296 0.000242 0.0132 0.00475
N 1,691 8,674 392 2,091
Table 1.11: Delinquency rates by FHA versus conventional loans and recall of the interest
rate. Variables are indicators for any ever having delinquency on the loan, any delinquency










Standard errors in parentheses










Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.12: Robustness check on FHA loans. Relation of interest rate recall to the cost-
adjusted interest rate spread, by FHA loans versus loans without a government guarantee.
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1.6.2 Relation to models of rational inattention
Price dispersion may alternatively be explained by a rational inattention model rather than
a search model. As proposed by Matejka and McKay (2015), a consumer may be able to
choose any firm in the market while being uncertain of the value of choosing each firm.
Instead of searching a discrete set of firms, the consumer engages in a more abstract in-
formation processing strategy to gather signals about the alternatives. Matejka and McKay
(2015) show that under certain assumptions15, the probability of choosing alternative j is





where λm is the unit cost of information processing for consumer type m. It is apparent
from Equation 1.23 that data on accepted prices cannot identify both λm and the prefer-
ence for unobserved nonprice product characteristics. An increase in either quantity would
amount to reduced price sensitivity and would have the effect of translating a given number
of observed high accepted prices into a larger number of high offered prices. Therefore this
section treats price as the only distinguishing characteristic of a mortgage offer, so that λm
in practice captures both information frictions and nonprice preferences.
Appendix 1.B shows that given the choice probabilities in Equation 1.23, a small firm
with cost rj would choose price pjm = rj + λm. Assuming that the two consumer types
share the same distribution of rj , the distribution of accepted prices should be the same for
each type except for a location shift due to different λm. The simplest estimation method
would be to estimate λ0−λ1 as E[pijm|m = 0]−E[pijm|m = 1], which equals 1.01.16 Non-
recallers would thus be estimated to have a higher cost of processing information. Still, it
would not be possible to identify the absolute level of λ0 or λ1.
In the data however, one accepted price distribution is not simply a shifted version of the
other. Figure 1.1 shows that the accepted price distributions are differently shaped for each
consumer type. Unlike with the sequential search model, it is impossible to find parameters
that give both types approximately the same distribution of cost of lending.
The combination of the rational inattention model and the common costs assumption
15Specifically, the information processing cost follows a specific entropy-based form and the alternatives
are a priori homogeneous.
16To be precise, we would like to estimate the difference between mean offered prices rather than mean
accepted prices. Appendix 1.B presents a preliminary discussion of how to calculate offer weights that relate
the unobserved price offer distributions to the observed accepted price distributions. This calculation is
analogous to Equation 1.22 in the main structural model of Section 1.3. Overall, offered prices will tend to
exceed accepted prices more for the attentive consumer type than for the inattentive. This will tend to cause
the difference λ0 − λ1 to be smaller than the mean difference in accepted prices.
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is thus rejected by the data. As both this paper and Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017) find,
brand preferences or other nonprice preferences play a large role in consumers’ mortgage
decisions. Subsuming nonprice preferences into the same parameter as the information
friction produces a simple model that is grounded in the behavioral economics literature
but that overlooks a key feature of the market, which may contribute to its apparent mis-
specification. Data that includes lender identifiers may improve the performance of this
model by disentangling two possible reasons for not choosing the lowest interest rate: un-
awareness that the rate was available versus a desire to prioritize nonprice aspects of the
mortgage.
1.7 Conclusion
Interest rate spreads in the mortgage market are far more variable than can be explained
by variation in the cost and risk of lending according to conventional metrics. This paper
identifies failure to recall the interest rate as a strong predictor of paying a higher rate. The
14 percent of consumers who did not recall their interest rates paid a full percentage point of
additional interest after controlling for cost-related variables. Correlations between interest
rate non-recall and other measures of inattention suggest that interest rate non-recall is
proxying for broad naı¨vete´ or disengagement from the process.
Consumer search is limited to about 1.7 firms on average, consistent with past survey
evidence. The weak relation between search intensity and price paid suggests that a se-
quential search model fits the market better than a simultaneous model of the sort used
by Woodward and Hall (2012). Estimating the sequential search model, I find that differ-
ences in interest rate outcomes between recallers and non-recallers cannot be explained by
differences in search intensity and are thus caused by differences in the optimal stopping
rule and in the distribution of offers received. Point identification rests on the assumption
that interest rate recall is unrelated to the cost of lending after controlling for conventional
metrics such as credit score and the loan-to-value ratio.
This paper assumes that both consumer types search rationally using a sequential search
model, allowing for both price and nonprice preferences. Assuming that lenders have the
same distribution of costs when lending to both types, the data is best explained by the two
types having moderately different preferences leading to substantial price discrimination.
Counterfactuals establish that about 10 percent of the penalty for interest rate non-
recall arises from differences in search strategy, with the remaining 90 percent coming
from differences in the estimated distribution of price offers. This result has important
implications for the optimal consumer search strategy and for consumer education. Price
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insensitivity and high search costs in themselves do not cause much worse outcomes for
inattentive consumers. However, having such preferences causes lenders to optimally price
discriminate heavily against the inattentive consumer. This discrimination could take the
form of “sizing up” the consumer and making an individually tailored offer, but it may
be more simply and realistically accomplished by leaving an opening for negotiation that
inattentive consumers fail to exploit.
In light of the substantial price discrimination found in this paper, consumer educa-
tion should continue to advocate negotiating to obtain the best possible offer as opposed
to simply searching more firms. The CFPB’s “Owning a Home” guide for instance sug-
gests contacting at least three lenders and negotiating on price, using loan estimates from
competing lenders to improve the consumer’s bargaining power. The strong link between
interest rate non-recall and paying a high rate suggests that motivating and informing the
least sophisticated mortgage borrowers could substantially reduce their tendency to pay
high rates.
Finally, it may be objected that the stronger price preference of recallers suggests they
may be paying more discount points or settling for worse non-price attributes. This would
imply that the consumer welfare penalty for non-recall is smaller than the price penalty
would suggest. Non-recallers do appear less sensitive to price when choosing when to stop
search, but it is not clear whether this is a true preference or simply the result of ignorance
that there are lower prices available. Data that includes discount points paid and lender
identifiers would be useful to determine whether recallers traded other loan attributes for a
lower rate as opposed to finding a better deal in both dimensions.
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Appendix
1.A Estimating Price Sensitivity αm under Simultaneous
Search
This section presents the simulation procedure used to estimate αm for a single consumer
type. Consumers of a given type (suppose recallers) are divided into those who search
once (ni = 1) and those who search twice (ni = 2), with all higher search intensities
discarded.17 Under simultaneous search the distribution of accepted prices for ni = 1 is
equal to the offer distribution.
I consider a large number of identical hypothetical ni = 2 consumers and simulate two
offers to each. Each offer consists of a rate spread pjm sampled from the prices accepted
by ni = 1 consumers and a nonprice utility εijm sampled from the assumed Gumbel(0, 1)
distribution. For each consumer there is a critical value α∗i above which the consumer
switches from the higher to the lower priced of his two offers. It is possible that α∗i is
negative. For some consumers the two prices are identical, in which case α∗i is undefined.
For consumers with two distinct prices I compute α∗i by
−α∗i pi1m + εi1m = −α∗i pi2m + εi2m (1.24)
α∗i (pi1m − pi2m) = εi1m − εi2m (1.25)
α∗i =
εi1m − εi2m
pi1m − pi2m (1.26)
For a given α, all consumers with α∗i < α choose the higher priced of their two offers
and all consumers with α∗i > α choose the lower priced. This implies that the simulated
mean accepted price for ni = 2 consumers is a weakly decreasing function of α. There
17As shown in Table 1.7, searching more than two firms is not associated with a substantial further de-































Coborrower score minus 750 -0.000663∗∗∗
(0.000172)
(Coborrower score minus 750)2 -0.00000126
(0.00000224)







Loan type FEs (e.g. FHA, conventional) Yes
Loan amount category FEs Yes







Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.A1: Tobit regression to adjust the rate spread for factors affecting the cost or risk
of lending. σ is the standard error of the residual.
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Figure 1.A1: Possible probability densities of price offers and firm costs, based on data
from consumers who did not recall the interest rate. There is no cost density for α = 0
because the optimal price to a completely price-insensitive consumer is infinite.
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NSMO variable Variable description Share of importance
1 z43 Recalled interest rate 0.415343
2 enterprise Fannie/Freddie/no GSE 0.051097
3 yq Year and quarter of loan 0.049234
4 z42 Recalled monthly payment 0.046592
5 z41 Recalled amount borrowed 0.024769
6 score r Respondent credit score 0.022335
7 loan amount cat Loan amount (categorical) 0.018983
8 loan type Loan type, e.g. FHA 0.016593
9 pmms PMMS average rate 0.01392
10 x66 Use of property 0.011471
11 x27b Believes rate was lowest available 0.008424
12 cltv Combined loan to value 0.007856
13 ltv Loan to value 0.0078
14 dti Debt to income 0.006722
15 z58 Recalled property price 0.005453
16 approx survey lag Months from loan to survey wave 0.005434
17 z67 Recalled move-in date 0.005301
18 pti Payment to income 0.005172
19 x74r Respondent age (categorical) 0.004978
20 x76r Respondent education 0.004573
21 survey wave Survey wave 0.004343
22 z64 Recalled rent received (if rental) 0.0041
23 x63 Rents out property 0.00371
24 x05a Initial familiarity with rates 0.003707
25 score s Coborrower credit score 0.003606
Table 1.A2: The 25 most important variables in a random forest model of the cost-adjusted










∆u(1 std. dev. accepted price)
∆u(1 std. dev.ε) 0.33 0.41
Price such that Pr(accept) = 0.5 0.22 -0.21
Q1 of firm cost distribution FOrg -1.38 -0.92
Q2 of firm cost distribution FOrg -0.63 -0.63
Q3 of firm cost distribution FOrg -0.21 -0.23
IQR of firm cost distribution FOrg 1.17 0.69
Mean of top 75 pct of cost distribution -0.34 -0.26









∆u(1 std. dev. accepted price)
∆u(1 std. dev.ε) 0.33 0.41
Price such that Pr(accept) = 0.5 0.22 -0.21
Q1 of firm cost distribution FOrg -1.38 -0.92
Q2 of firm cost distribution FOrg -0.63 -0.63
Q3 of firm cost distribution FOrg -0.21 -0.23
IQR of firm cost distribution FOrg 1.17 0.69
Mean of top 75 pct of cost distribution -0.34 -0.26








∆u(1 std. dev. accepted price)
∆u(1 std. dev.ε) 0.55 0.76
Price such that Pr(accept) = 0.5 1.93 0.73
Q1 of firm cost distribution FOrg -1.81 -1.95
Q2 of firm cost distribution FOrg -0.26 -0.39
Q3 of firm cost distribution FOrg 0.4 0.92
IQR of firm cost distribution FOrg 2.21 2.87
Mean of top 75 pct of cost distribution -0.54 -0.36
Table 1.A5: Robustness check: Alternative trimming of the cost distribution (1). Replicates
Table 1.8 while minimizing the difference between cost distributions disregarding the bot-








Non-recaller preferences with predicted non-recaller offers 1.37 1.72
Non-recaller preferences with recaller offers 0.4 1.63
Recaller preferences with predicted non-recaller offers 1.11 2.13
Table 1.A6: Robustness check: Limit to the most creditworthy borrowers. Replicates Table
1.9 using borrowers with no more than 80 percent loan to value and 18 percent payment to
income ratios, credit score at least 772, and reporting that they were “not at all” concerned
about qualifying for a loan. Among these consumers there are 1435 recallers and 256
non-recallers.
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Figure 1.A2: Robustness check: Alternative trimming of the cost distribution (2). Repli-
cates Figure 1.3 while minimizing the difference between cost distributions disregarding
the bottom 10 percent of each distribution. The main estimation disregards the bottom 25
percent of each distribution.
is a range of α such that the simulated mean accepted price for ni = 2 consumers is
approximately equal to its sample analogue.
Mechanically, α is found as follows. Order the consumers by increasing α∗i , treating
undefined as +∞. Compute (A) the cumulative sum of consumers’ higher prices and (B)
the reverse cumulative sum of consumers’ lower prices. Then when α is just above α∗i ,
the sum of accepted prices is the ith element of (A) plus the N − i element of (B), where
N is the number of simulated consumers. The implied mean accepted price is this value
divided by N . I select the α that most closely matches the implied mean accepted price to
to the sample analogue E[pjm|ni = 2,m]. With a large number of simulated consumers
this match is essentially exact.
To demonstrate the method, Figure 1.A1 shows 8 simulated consumers instead of 10
million. Since consumers differ in the prices and nonprice utilities of their offers, each
consumer has a different critical value α∗i above which he chooses the lower priced of his
two offers. Ordering the consumers by increasing α∗i , consumer 1 has offers L = (pL =
−0.14, εL = 1.35) and H = (pH = 0.12, εH = −0.76). Since the higher priced offer H is
also worse in nonprice terms, it will only be chosen if the consumer has a strong taste for
paying higher prices. Specifically, consumer 1’s choice as a function of α is
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Figure 1.A1: Illustration of the simultaneous search model estimation method, using 8 sim-
ulated consumers instead of the 10 million used in the actual analysis. The estimate of α is
the range (−0.11, 1.26) (with α < 0 implying that consumers like to pay more). Data: con-
sumers who recalled the interest rate and seriously considered either 1 or 2 lenders/brokers.
choose L ⇐⇒ α > α∗1, (1.27)
α∗1 =
εH − εL
pH − pL = −2.25 (1.28)
For α < α∗1 consumer 1 and all others accept the higher priced of their two offers,
leading to a mean accepted price of 0.50. Once α increases above α∗1, consumer 1 switches
to his lower priced offer and the mean accepted price falls to 0.37. This process repeats at
α∗2 = −1.88, α∗3 = −1.83 and so on as more consumers switch. For α ∈ (−0.11, 1.26) the
mean accepted price is 0.27, which of the possible mean accepted prices best approximates
the sample mean accepted price 0.23 for interest rate recalling consumers with ni = 2. In
this small-scale demonstration, α ∈ (−0.11, 1.26) would be the estimated price sensitivity
needed to explain the data by a simultaneous search model.
Figure 1.A2 repeats this analysis with 10 million simulated consumers. The size of each
step is now trivially small so that α is essentially point-estimated. Again, the estimated α
is where the simulated mean accepted price equals the observed mean for ni = 2, in this
case α = 0.23. Observe that where α = 0 the simulated mean price instead equals the
observed mean price for ni = 1, which is the mean of the offer distribution. Intuitively,
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Figure 1.A2: Estimation of the sequential search model with 10 million simulated con-
sumers. The estimated α is 0.21. Data: consumers who recalled the interest rate and
seriously considered either 1 or 2 lenders/brokers.
α = 0 makes consumers equally likely to choose the low price or the high, so that drawing
ni = 2 instead of ni = 1 does not affect the distribution of accepted prices.
Matching predicted and observed ni = 2 accepted prices with this procedure yields
α = 0.21. This value can be transformed into a relative utility of price versus non-price
characteristics. The standard deviation of ni = 1 accepted prices is 0.43, while the stan-
dard deviation of nonprice utility was normalized to 1.28 by the Gumbel(0, 1) form. Each
standard deviation of offered p is thus worth only 0.24·0.43
1.28
= 0.07 of a standard deviation in
offered ε.
1.B Derivation of the Markup under Rational Inattention
The choice probability 1.23 was developed by Matejka and McKay (2015) for a discrete
choice set. I assume that the set of offers is discrete but that there are many offers in the
market at each price. Specifically, suppose that there are N offers in the market and wtOkm
is the probability that an offer has price pk. Then the probability of a consumer finding and
accepting a specific offer with price pk is
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while the probability of accepting any offer with price pk is

































































recalling that Pr(i chooses pk) is estimated by the number of observed prices pk weighted
by their original NSMO survey weights wtAijm. Equation 1.38 thus has only two unknowns
for a given price pk: the information processing cost λm and the weight wtOkm. Thus given
λm it is possible to identify wtOkm, the frequency with which a price pk is offered to type m.




using Equation 1.29 and the assumption that there are many firms (so the effect of
one firm’s price choice on the denominator of 1.29 is negligible). The firm’s first order
condition is
0 = e−p/λm − (p− r) 1
λm
e−p/λm (1.40)
0 = 1− (p− r) 1
λm
(1.41)
(p− r) = λm (1.42)
Intuitively, firms tend to choose higher markups when the unit cost of information pro-
cessing λm is high. When λ = 0 consumers pay full attention to all alternatives in the
market and the outcome is Bertrand competition. The many firms that are tied for the
lowest cost capture the entire the market.
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Chapter 2
Consumer Search and Switching Costs
in Equilibrium
Consider a market in which consumers engage in simultaneous search for a single unit
of a differentiated product. Each firm has one product for sale and takes the nonprice
characteristics of this product as fixed. Each consumer begins with unbiased estimates of
(1) the nonprice value to the consumer of each product and (2) the price the consumer would
be charged for each product. Searching a product reveals an idiosyncratic consumer-firm
match shock: either a cost shock that is passed through to the consumer or a direct shock
to consumer utility.
This paper shows how equilibrium outcomes in such a market depend on consumers’
willingness to search for competing offers and to switch their purchases to a competing
firm, with an empirical application to the auto insurance industry. I extend a search and
switching cost demand model estimated by Honka (2014) with the addition of a supply
side, allowing auto insurers to respond in equilibrium to changes in consumer search and
switching costs.
The analyis proceeds in two steps. First, I use the estimated demand parameters of
Honka (2014) to estimate each firm’s marginal cost of selling an additional insurance pol-
icy. I assume that firms maximize their present discounted profits and present a method for
calculating market shares in future time periods, based on the insight that consumers in the
Honka (2014) model transition from firm to firm following a Markov process. I present a
simulation-based method for evaluating the transition matrix, from which the entire history
of market shares can be easily recovered by matrix multiplication.
With demand and cost estimates in hand, I evaluate the equilibrium impact of counter-
factual changes in search and switching costs. In equilibrium, each of the fourteen insurers
modeled chooses a mean price offer to maximize its present discounted profit given the
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mean price offers chosen by other firms. To efficiently solve for the equilibrium, I take
advantage of a typical property of most common demand models: namely, that comput-
ing elasticities imposes little or no additional burden when computing market shares. This
property provides the basis for an efficient solution process I label approximate best re-
sponse iteration—in fact the multivariate version of Newton’s method. Papers proposing
this method for solving games include Li and Bas¸ar (1987), Baldick and Hogan (2004),
Facchinei, Fischer and Piccialli (2009), while Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) demonstrate
its usefulness in evaluating the equilibrium response of the airline industry to changes in
various costs. While I do not determine whether the model has a unique equilibrium, I argue
that the equilibrium found by approximate best response iteration starting at the observed
prices is the most realistic outcome if firms make discrete price adjustments informed by
demand elasticities at their current prices.
A frictionless market is not necessarily a benefit to consumers or a detriment to firms,
and I find that lower search or switching costs cause equilibrium prices to increase. In the
case of search costs, this effect is due to the role of search in differentiating firms. When
consumers have low search costs, firms compete less to be searched and more to be chosen
following the consumer’s (simultaneous) search. This latter competition is less sharp as the
information revealed by search serves to differentiate the firms. A crucial assumption is that
consumers are informed about each firm’s mean price offer before beginning their search. If
consumers are completely uninformed about prices before beginning their search, evidence
from the sequential search models of Wolinsky (1986) and Haan et al. (2017) suggests that
higher search costs will lead to higher prices.
Equally counterintuitively, I find that auto insurers would choose higher price offers
and earn higher profits in equilibrium if switching costs were reduced. Consumer loyalty
motives firms to exploit currently loyal customers with high prices, but also to gain new
loyal customers with low prices. These goals are in conflict given the reputational and often
regulatory obstacles to a dynamic or discriminatory pricing strategies in many industries,
including auto insurance. Empirically, I find that the business development effect wins out
in equilibrium. Halving the preference for remaining with the same firm would increase
the price of six months of coverage by $28, or 5 percent.
The results provide support for voluntary efforts by firms to lower consumer search and
switching costs across their industries. Websites that facilitate comparison may increase
seller profits in a differentiated marketplace by communicating the particulars of product
differentiation to consumers. Industries can also gain slightly higher profits by facilitating
consumer switching, although eliminating switching costs is estimated to generate a smaller
profit increase than eliminating search costs. Generally, initiatives to facilitate switching
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might include product standardization, streamlined application and purchase processes, or
data transferability for tracking programs such as Progressive Snapshot or American Fam-
ily’s KnowYourDrive that adjust premia in response to driving behavior.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 extends the Honka (2014)
model to include dynamics and a supply side. Section 2.3 illustrates in a simplified, static
version of this model why increasing search costs can either increase prices (by making
weaker firms less relevant as competitors) or decrease prices (by concealing from con-
sumers some aspects of product differentiation). Section 2.4 summarizes the data, Section
2.5 presents the estimation strategy, and Section 2.6 presents estimation results including
counterfactual simulations.
Section 2.7 relates the results to the theoretical literature on search and switching. I
argue that the decreasing relation between market frictions and equilibrium prices is due
to the assumed ex ante observability of prices (for search costs) and the assumption that
firms cannot pursue a “bait and switch” pricing strategy (for switching costs). Section 2.8
concludes with implications for policy and modeling.
2.2 Model
This section defines a two-stage model of directed simultaneous search and product choice,
closely following Honka (2014). Each consumer demands one six-month auto insurance
policy. Consumer i purchasing at firm j has utility
uijt = αj − βWij,t−1 − γpijt + εijt (2.1)
The indicator Wij,t−1 takes value 1 if the consumer switches insurers, i.e. was not
insured by firm j in period t− 1.1
Consumers initially know all components of uijt, except pijt which they learn by search-
ing. Here pijt represents the price adjusted for various consumer characteristics likely to be
associated with the insurance risk and premium. Examples include the number of drivers
on the policy, their history of accidents and traffic tickets, and whether any driver on the
policy is under 25 years old.2 Firm j’s adjusted price offer is distributed (independently
1Honka (2014) equivalently defines β as the positive addition to utility for not switching. I adopt the oppo-
site convention so that a lower β represents a reduction in search costs, directly making switching consumers
better off and nonswitching consumers no worse off.
2Details of this adjustment are in Honka (2014).
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across firms) as
pijt ∼ Gumbel(pj − µec, µ) (2.2)
where pj is a baseline price offer chosen by firm j, µ is a scale parameter determining
the dispersion of prices within a firm, and ec ≈ 0.577 is Euler’s constant. The mean of
this distribution is pj . The remaining terms in Equation 2.1 are a brand value αj and a
preference shock εijt. Consumers initially know αj , εijt, and pj but discover pijt only by
searching firm j.
Define firm j’s ex ante utility to consumer i as
uanteijt = αj − γpj + εijt (2.3)
.
From the perspective of a consumer choosing a firm to search, the ex post utility uijt
is distributed as uanteijt minus γ times a mean zero price shock. The distribution of uijt
thus differs across firms only by a location shift, allowing firms to be ranked by first order
stochastic dominance. Applying the intuitive selection rule of Chade and Smith (2006),
consumers direct their search to the firms with highest uanteijt .
To rationalize the fact that consumers do not search all firms, assume that the con-
sumer’s utility is diminished by a search cost c for every firm searched. Following Honka
(2014), I make an exception for the consumer’s previous insurer and assume that the con-
sumer automatically searches it without paying a search cost (by receiving a renewal notice
or by automatically renewing). Overall the consumer’s expected utility is
E[ui] = E[max
j∈Ki
uijt]− c(|Ki| − 1) (2.4)
where Ki is the set of firms searched and |Ki| its size. The optimal Ki can be found
by starting with the previous insurer and adding firms in order of decreasing uanteijt , stopping
when an addition would decrease expected utility.
I turn now to the firm’s problem. Assume that if firm j serves consumer i, it receives
a price of pijt and incurs a cost of rijt. At its broadest, the firm’s problem could involve
choosing a price pijt for each consumer and time period. Instead I take as fixed the variation
in a firm’s price offers and consider only each firm’s choice of its mean price offer pj .
Formally, let rj be a base level of marginal cost for each firm and assume
Assumption A1. pijt − rijt = pj − rj
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Assumption A1 equivalently states that the price shock (pijt−pj) represents a full pass-
through of additional costs incurred by the firm from the match between consumer i and
firm j. These costs may be real or merely perceived. Insurers for instance may differ in
the amount and type of coverage offered by their standard plans. This could make certain
consumers more costly for some insurers than for others. Insurers may also differ in their
risk assessments of a given consumer and may pass on these perceived risk differences to
their quoted premiums.
The benefit of Assumption A1 is to simplify the firm’s profit maximization problem
in two ways. First, all consumers are equally profitable to serve. Firms can thus consider
only their overall market shares rather than considering which particular consumers are
attracted by a particular pricing policy. Second, the firm’s problem of setting many prices
pijt is reduced to the choice of a single baseline price offer pj .
An opposite assumption would be that variation in (pijt − pj) represents price dis-
crimination unrelated to the cost or risk of providing the service. Honka (2014) notes for
instance that some auto insurers offer lower premiums to new customers. However, state
regulations commonly require that premium differences be justified on the basis of cost,
which may limit the scope of price discrimination. The possible presence of price discrim-
ination in auto insurance is discussed further in Section 2.7.
Letting p be the vector of all firms’ prices, firm j maximizes its discounted stream of








Pr(i chooses j|p)(pijt − rijt) (2.5)









Pr(i chooses j|p) (2.6)
I set δ = 1√
1.06
for an annual discount rate of 6 percent and T = 100 for a 50-year
driving career of an individual consumer. While these parameter choices are somewhat
arbitrary, the data rejects the assumption that firms maximize only their immediate profits.
Setting T = 1 in the estimation (Section 2.5) produces unreasonably low marginal cost
estimates for the major insurers. For the largest insurer Geico, assuming infinite discount-
ing (T = 1) leads to a negative estimate of marginal cost. Cost estimates under alternative
assumptions on discounting are summarized in Table 2.8.4.
I assume that each consumer draws new preferences in each period. Any persistence in
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consumer behavior is captured in reduced form by the inertia value of choosing the same
insurer as in the previous period. Consumer movements across firms thus form a Markov
process with transition matrix P . The vector of market shares in time period t is st = s0P t,
allowing for an efficient evaluation of a firm’s objective function in 2.5
The model applies equally to settings in which search reveals an additional nonprice
preference shock rather than a price shock resulting from a cost shock. For instance, a
car buyer may search by taking test drives that reveal each vehicle’s comfort and handling
(Moraga-Gonza´lez et al., 2015).
2.3 More search may increase or decrease prices
Consumer search in this model serves to reveal a price shock representing a passed-through
cost shock, which from the firm’s perspective is equivalent to informing the consumer
about additional product differentiation. I argue that consumer search of this sort has an
ambiguous effect on equilibrium prices, justifying this paper’s empirical investigation of
the effects.
A simple static model provides intuition for this ambiguity. Consider a market with
two firms and no outside option. Each firm j has zero marginal cost and offers a product of
quality qj , with q1 ≥ q2 = 0. Suppose that if consumers know only the price and quality of
each product, they choose according to the utility function uij = qj − pj . If q1 > q2 then
the standard Bertrand-Nash result is an equilibrium price p∗1 slightly less than q1, with Firm
1 capturing the entire market. If q1 = q2 then p∗1 = p
∗
2 = 0.
Now suppose that instead of choosing based on price and quality alone, consumers
search both firms and discover some aspect of horizontal product differentiation. In partic-
ular, consider the case of the Hotelling (1929) model and suppose that each product has a
location or variety that has been discovered by search. Assume that Firm 1 is at location 0,
Firm 2 is at location 1, and that consumers are uniformly distributed along the unit interval
with travel cost equal to the distance to the selected firm. It is well known that product
differentiation of this sort, if revealed to consumers, can increase equilibrium prices. If
both firms have quality q1 = q2 = 0 for instance, the equilibrium price will increase from
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = 0 in the undifferentiated Bertrand case to 1 in the Hotelling model.
On the other hand the Hotelling model may produce lower prices than the Bertrand
model, provided that one of the firms is much weaker than the other. Suppose q1 = 2. If in
the Hotelling model Firm 1 attempted to charge its undifferentiated Bertrand equilibrium
price of 2, a consumer near location 1 would have utility slightly above -1 from purchasing
from Firm 1. An opening is created for Firm 2 to gain positive market share, unless Firm 1
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reacts.
By a standard derivation for the Hotelling model, the equilibrium prices as a function
of q1 are p∗1 = 1 +
q1
3
, p∗2 = 1 − q13 . This implies p∗1 = 53 for q1 = 2, which is less than
the Bertrand price. The Hotelling equilibrium still has all consumers choosing Firm 1 as
in the Bertrand case. Yet by creating a group of customers especially interested in Firm 2,
the Hotelling model improves Firm 2’s competitive position and forces Firm 1 to lower its
price.
A notable threshold in this comparison is at q1 = 32 . For q1 <
3
2
, the Hotelling model
produces a higher equilibrium price than the Bertrand model. Competitors of similar qual-
ity levels raise their prices in the presence of search due to a well known product differen-
tiation effect. When q1 > 32 , a relevant competitors effect dominates. Informing consumers
about horizontal differentiation randomly perturbs the market, to the advantage of firms
whose products were unpopular before the perturbation.3
2.4 Data
This section summarizes the data and demand estimates of Honka (2014), which are used
as inputs to the full equilibrium model of this paper. Honka uses detailed survey data on
consumer search and purchases to estimate both search costs and the cost of switching to a
new insurance provider.
For each consumer, Honka (2014) observes the current insurer, previous insurer, and
a list of insurers from whom the consumer obtained quotes. Premiums are observed only
for the insurer the consumer chooses, although Honka reconstructs likely premiums quoted
by the other firms. Premiums are adjusted for consumer characteristics such as number of
past accidents, living in an urban area, and being under 25 years old. Combining the data
on search, choice, and price, Honka estimates several demand models. I apply Honka’s
simplest demand model “Model 0”, described in the previous section). Model 1 allows for
arbitrary correlations in consumer tastes εijt for different insurers, while Model 2 addition-
ally relates consumer preferences to demographic and psychographic differences such as
the consumer’s interest in finance and satisfaction with the previous insurer.
As in Honka (2014), I assume consumers search simultaneously rather than sequen-
tially. Honka and Chintagunta (2017) provide evidence that simultaneous search is a more
plausible data generating process for the Honka data. Sequential search would imply that
consumers who stopped searching after the first search were more likely to have a below-
3Economides (1989) considers a Hotelling model in which firms choose differentiated locations, quality
levels, and prices. In equilibrium, firms choose as much differentiation as possible.
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average price draw conditional on their choice of firm. The authors find that this pattern
does not appear in the data.
In order to model insurance competition at the national level, this paper excludes three
firms noted by Honka (2014) as having a limited geographic range of operation: American
Family, Erie, and Mercury. The combined market share of these firms was 8 percent.
Table 2.8.2 reports basic characteristics of the insurers: their average price offers, market
shares, and brand values (including any effects attributed to advertising in Honka (2014)).
Table 2.8.3 reports other parameters of the demand model such as the estimated search and
switching costs.
2.5 Estimation
Taking as given the estimated demand “Model 0” of Honka (2014) (with the reduced
switching cost noted in the previous section), I estimate each firm’s base level of marginal
cost rj corresponding to a consumer with pijt − pj = 0. The cost estimates are used later
to model the equilibrium response of firms to changes in search or switching costs.
Estimation begins by finding the Markov transition matrix P of consumer movements
across firms. The element Pkj′ is the market share of firm j′ among consumers who were
insured by firm k in the previous period. As noted by Honka (2014) there is no obvious
analytic solution for these market shares, which necessitates the use of Monte Carlo simu-
lation for both taste shocks εij′t and price shocks (pij′t − p′j). Honka (2014) uses a kernel
smoothed frequency simulator for maximum likelihood estimation of the demand model.
However, cost estimation requires computing not only the market shares but their deriva-
tives with respect to prices, which motivates the different simulation approach described
below.
To find Pkj′ , I take simulation draws of the εijt of all firms other than j′, and for the
(pijt − pj) of all firms. Holding out εij′ from simulation retains some randomness in the
purchase decision, leading to a non-degenerate market share of firm j′ and allowing for the
evaluation of derivatives. Fixing a single simulated consumer i, the calculation proceeds in
two steps.
First, identify for every value of εij′ the optimal set of firms to search. The Chade and
Smith (2006) rule of selecting the top-ranked firms simplifies this problem. For the lowest
values of εij′ , the optimal search set is the set that would be searched if firm εij′ did not
exist. This set is found by starting with the initial firm and adding firms from (ex ante)
best to worst, until expected utility no longer increases. As εij′ increases, firm j′ enters the
search set either as an addition or as a replacement for the worst firm in the search set (in
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terms of ex ante utility).4
As εij′ grows further, it becomes optimal to successively drop the ex ante worst firms
in the search set. Intuitively, searching a firm other than j′ becomes less valuable as j′
becomes more likely to be the ex post best firm. The worst firms are dropped from the
search set until only firm j′ remains—along with the previous insurer, which is automati-
cally searched. I solve numerically for the thresholds of εij′ at which the optimal search set
changes. Table 2.8.1 shows one simulated consumer’s possible optimal search sets, as well
as the thresholds of εij′ that separate these search sets.
Second, I find the probability of accepting the offer of firm j′ conditional on searching
a given set of firms Ki. Again taking as given εijt for all j 6= j′, I iterate over vectors of
simulated price shocks (pijt − p) and find the average conditional probability that firm j
has the highest utility. As discussed above (and illustrated in Table 2.8.1), the decision to
search set Ki implies that εij′ is within some known range. It is this truncated distribution
of εij′ that is used to compute the following conditional acceptance probability.




′ accepted|Ki searched, εijt ∀j 6= j′, (pijt − p) = q,Wk = 0) (2.7)
The final probability of simulated consumer i searching and then purchasing from firm
j′ is




[Pr(Ki searched|εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk = 0) ∗
Pr(j′ accepted|Ki searched, εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk = 0)] (2.8)
Finally, consumer-specific market shares are averaged over the simulated consumers to
give Pkj′ . The derivative
dPkj′
dpj
is found similarly by averaging over simulated consumers,
with the consumer-specific price derivative found by differentiating 2.8 using the product
rule. Details of the price derivatives of the search and conditional acceptance probabilities
are in Appendix 2.A.
The simulation uses 200 Gumbel(0, 1) vectors of taste shocks εijt and 1,000 Gumbel(pj−
µec, µ) vectors of price shocks (pijt−pj).5 After computing the transition matrix P of mar-
4I find the value of εij′ at which the consumer would be indifferent about replacing the worst searched
firm with j′. If at this value of εij′ the consumer prefers to add j′ to the search set without dropping the worst
firm, then firm j′ enters as an addition rather than a replacement (and may enter at a different εij′ value,
which I again find numerically).
5Simulation draws were taken from a Halton sequence to reduce sampling error.
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ket shares conditional on the previous insurer, I find each firm’s present discounted profit
as defined in Equation 2.5. The vector of market shares at time t is given by
st = P ts0 (2.9)
where s0 = P−1s1 and s1 is the vector of observed market shares.
Given P and its own and cross-price derivatives dPjk
dpm
, I estimate each firm’s marginal












(pj − rj)qj (2.11)
implying the standard first order condition





The value of dqj
dpj
is found by automatic differentiation of Equation 2.10, using the ex-
pression for market shares in Equation 2.9.6. In addition to estimating costs, Equation 2.12
provides the basis for this paper’s counterfactual predictions of how firms would change
their price offers given a change in consumer search or switching costs.
2.5.1 Approximate best response iteration
Consider the supply-side response to a counterfactual change in the parameters of the de-
mand model. At the new market equilibrium, prices p are such that equation 2.12 is satisfied
for every firm j. To find p satisfying these conditions, I use an approximate version of best
response iteration that takes a first-order Taylor approximation to dqj
dpj
. This approach was
shown by Baldick and Hogan (2004) to either find a Nash equilibrium (to within the user’s
choice of precision) or fail to converge.
Each iteration begins with a current vector of prices p˜, at which I evaluate discounted
6Automatic differentiation is by the ForwardDiff package in Julia.
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market shares q˜ and dq
dp








Taking the first order condition gives a closed form solution for the price pj .
0 = (q˜j + (pj − p˜j)
dqj
dpj



















Approximate best response iteration updates all prices simultaneously by this method
and uses the solution as the next candidate p˜. This process continues until convergence,
requiring only one evaluation of the transition matrix P and its derivatives on each iteration.
Toward the equilibrium, the difference between the initial candidate p˜ and the new solution
p approaches zero. This implies that the error introduced by the Taylor approximation
also approaches zero. For all counterfactuals, convergence was achieved in 8 iterations or
fewer.7
Approximate best response iteration can be used to solve any sufficiently well-behaved
system of nonlinear equations, where it is more generally known as the multivariate Newton
method. However, it is particularly suitable to finding Nash equilibria in economic models,
as demonstrated by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) in solving a game of airline competition.
Each airline is assumed to have a local manager for each city pair, whose (mixed) strategy
is the probability with which to operate flights between the cities. Despite the very large
number of players in the game (32,670), approximate best response iteration succeeds in
identifying an equilibrium.
For typical models in industrial organization, approximate best response iteration has
several advantages over competing methods. Computing market shares and profits is of-
ten computationally costly, preventing the explicit computation of best responses needed
by the Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel methods. Yet once profits are calculated, the own-price
derivatives of the profit functions tend to be readily available as these are also needed for
cost estimation. In this paper’s problem, evaluating P may take up to 15 minutes, but also




does not significantly increase the computational burden.8 In all counterfactuals,
convergence was achieved in 8 iterations or fewer.
In addition, approximate best response iteration incorporates an intuitively convincing
equilibrium selection rule. Given a counterfactual change in parameters, the selected equi-
librium is that which is reached by firms starting from the observed prices and iteratively
maximizing a heuristic profit function based on currently observed elasticities. In the case
that approximate best response iteration fails to converge, the researcher has recourse to
more complex derivative-based methods such as the global Newton method (Govindan and
Wilson, 2003) implemented in specialized software such as Gambit.
2.6 Results
Table 2.8.5 presents observed market shares and prices alongside estimates of present dis-
counted market shares and marginal costs, taking as given the demand model and estimates
of Honka (2014). In some cases the discounted market share is quite different from the
observed market share. For instance, the model predicts that relatively small insurer 21st
Century will surpass the market leader Geico if both maintain their pricing policies and
brand values.
The cost estimates in Table 2.8.5 are used as inputs to counterfactual simulations of
different search and switching costs. Honka (2014) estimates a search cost of c = 0.1663
in terms of utility, equivalent to $42 per firm searched. The switching cost is β = 1.3375,
or $336. These sizable frictions help to explain the 74 percent retention rate found by
Honka (2014). Suppose counterfactually that search costs are reduced, for example by the
increased availability and use of online shopping since the 2006 data collection of Honka
(2014), or by the rise since the early 2000s of price comparison websites. The rise of online
shopping may have also decreased switching costs.
Table 2.8.7 presents the results of the counterfactual simulations. Comparing Cases 1
and 2 with the baseline equilibrium shows that prices would be increased by reducing or
removing switching costs. Intuitively, firms compete more fiercely for loyal consumers than
for consumers with little or no inertia. Moreover, this pro-competitive effect outweighs the
benefit to firms of attempting to exploit their currently loyal customers by setting a high pj .
This intuition is discussed further in Section 2.7, along with its connection to the literature
on switching costs.
Cases 3 through 9 of Table 2.8.7 explore the impact of changing search costs (while
maintaining the estimated switching cost). Perhaps counterintuitively, firms increase their
8Differentiation of P is discussed in Appendix 2.A.
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prices as search costs decrease. The explanation lies in the information available to con-
sumers. At higher search costs, consumers tend to narrow their options more at the search
stage before the (pijt − pj) are known. Firms are thus more differentiated at the choice
stage than at the search stage, implying that firms charge higher markups when they com-
pete primarily at the choice stage. Section 2.7 returns to this argument in detail.
The last counterfactual (Case 10) simulates a frictionless market with no search or
switching costs (although the initial firm still offers a free search through a renewal offer).
Curiously the mean price offer is lower than if only switching costs are removed (Case 3),
suggesting an anti-competitive effect of search costs in this case. One explanation is that
without inertia to retain their current customers, some firms are likely to be uncompetitive
due to high costs or poor quality. A low or zero search cost may be necessary for these
weak firms to be searched and to offer real competition to firms with low costs and high
quality products.
The consumer impact of removing search and switching costs depends on how switch-
ing costs are interpreted. One view is that these costs consist mainly of real money and
time costs, and that a rational consumer would indeed pay $336 as Honka (2014) estimates
to avoid switching. This view seems at odds with the fact that switching can be done in
minutes (or at most, a few hours) once the consumer has searched the firm. Woodward and
Hall (2012) make a similar argument after estimating that mortgage consumers sacrifice
over $1,000 by shopping from too few mortgage brokers. Following Woodward and Hall
(2012), implied consumer “costs” that are very disproportionate to the time and expense
involved may be better interpreted as resulting from behavioral biases or from unawareness
of the opportunities available.
Column 4 of Table 2.8.7 reports consumer surplus if search and switching costs are in-
terpreted as real costs, while Column 5 excludes them as not representative of an informed
and rational consumer’s welfare. If search and switching costs are real costs, removing
switching costs (Case 2) benefits consumers in the amount of $111 as the ability to switch
freely outweighs the impact of increasing equilibrium prices. If instead search and switch-
ing costs are viewed as behavioral only, consumer surplus is essentially unaffected by the
removal of switching costs.
Removing search costs would benefit consumers despite increasing prices. Compar-
ing the baseline case to the removal of search costs in Case 9, consumers gain surplus of
$22 including search and switching costs or $50 excluding these costs. However, merely
reducing search costs may result in lower consumer welfare, as shown by comparing the
baseline case to Case 6. The consumer harm from higher prices may not be outweighed
by the newly increased tendency to search, or by the (real or imagined) benefit of paying
63
less in search costs. In Case 10, removing all frictions benefits consumers relative to the
baseline.
Some firms are more responsive than others to changes in search and switching costs.
Firms can be classified as strong or weak according to the total surplus created by a transac-
tion between the firm and a baseline consumer with εijt = 0, (pijt − pjt) = 0. The strength
of firm j is the total surplus
αj − γrj (2.17)
Figure 2.8.1 shows that “strong” firms whose transactions create high total surplus tend
to increase their prices more than other firms when switching costs are removed from the
market, but perhaps slightly less than other firms when search costs are removed. One
interpretation is that switching costs advantage weak firms, who may benefit from a single
advantageous taste shock εijt in one time period and retain the consumer beyond that period
despite generally offering lower quality and higher prices. With switching costs removed,
weak firms become less relevant as competitors, allowing strong firms to increase their
prices.
2.6.1 Applicability of the estimates
The firms I identify as “strong” with high total surplus do not necessarily have high market
shares in Honka’s 2006-2007 data. Geico for instance is far from the strongest firm but has
the highest market share. The subsequent evolution of market shares also fails to support
the classification of firms by strength. In addition to total surplus, Table 2.8.5 shows each
insurer’s share in the 2006-2007 data and (for the largest insurers in 2018) its 2018 market
share. State Farm was predicted to lose most of its market share, but instead became the
market leader by 2018. Some particularly strong firms such as The Hartford and Liberty
Mutual were expected to more than double their market shares but instead saw their market
shares decline.
Changes in costs, strategies, and consumer tastes may partly explain the lack of con-
vergence of market shares to their predicted values. Additionally, the large insurers may
have benefitted from consumers newly entering the market with only limited awareness of
the brands available. Newly entering consumers are not included in the survey data. An-
other explanation is that some model parameters are incorrectly estimated. For instance, a
firm that discounted its future earnings sharply and strategically chose high markups would
have its marginal cost overestimated by this paper’s method. Regardless of the validity of
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the 2006-2007 estimates, it is clear that the market has evolved substantially since then.9
Counterfactual simulations based on the estimates are of limited value for assessing poten-
tial impacts on today’s insurance market. Nonetheless these simulations offer qualitative
insights into the relation between search and switching costs and market outcomes.
Another way to gauge the realism of the results is to compare marginal cost estimates
to costs reported by firms in their annual reports. For example, Progressive in 2006 re-
ported claims expenses (losses and loss adjustments) equal to 66.5 percent of revenue, plus
underwriting expenses equal to an additional 20.1 percent of revenue. The marginal cost
of writing an additional policy to a typical customer should thus equal 66.5 percent of the
premium to pay expected claims, plus between zero and 19 percent of the premium to cover
additional underwriting resources needed to originate and service the policy.
I find that the (sales-weighted) average of marginal costs is 65 percent of the average
premium paid, a value which Table 2.8.6 suggests may be too low. Annual reports of the
four largest insurers from around the time of Honka’s data collection show average claims
expenses of around 70 percent of premiums and underwriting expenses of around 20 per-
cent of premiums, suggesting that the average marginal cost should lie between 70 and
90 percent of the average premium paid. The model fails to explain why insurers do not
choose higher prices in light of the demand estimates, with estimation resorting to some-
what low marginal cost estimates as an explanation. Accurate cost estimation and accurate
predictions may require starting with a significantly more detailed demand model such as
Honka’s “Model 2” with persistent consumer heterogeneity. The approach I propose in this
paper generalizes naturally to a setting with multiple consumer types, by constructing a
different Markov transition matrix for each type. Incorporating additional types will natu-
rally increase the computational and data requirements, making the continuous type space
of Model 2 intractable under this approach unless the type space is reduced. A question
raised in Honka (2014) is how to interpret the large inertia term β, estimated at 1.3375
in Model 0 and equivalent to a price increase of $336 on a six-month policy. Honka’s
“Model 2” models the switching cost as a linear combination of several demographic and
psychographic measures, as well as the consumer’s satisfaction with various aspects of the
insurer’s service. Honka attempts to separate inertia β into switching costs and satisfaction-
based inertia, concluding that only about 10 percent of inertia is attributable to switching
costs. However, all that can properly be concluded from such an exercise is the difference
in inertia between customers of different satisfaction levels. A truly dissatisfied customer
will be more likely to switch firms, and might indeed exhibit as little as 10 percent as much
9Technological progress in auto insurance must also be considered. For instance, some insurers now offer
in-car trackers that allow insurance rates to vary based on driving habits.
65
inertia as a more satisified consumer as Honka (2014) finds. Yet the full inertia of a typical
customer can rightly be labeled a switching cost. This inertia is found in Honka’s Model
0 when all consumers are assigned the same inertia. Efforts to attribute part of this typical
consumer’s inertia to customer satisfaction must be limited to relative comparisons such as
how much inertia is reduced by the typical customer being less than fully satisfied.
2.7 Comparison with other models of search and switch-
ing
2.7.1 Search costs
The results above can be explained in terms of two largely separate theoretical literatures on
differentiated product market equilibrium, in the presence of either search costs or switch-
ing costs. Within the search cost literature, the closest parallel to this paper (and to Honka
(2014)) is Haan, Moraga-Gonza´lez and Petrikaite (2017). The main differences are that
Haan et al. (2017) assume (1) a symmetric duopoly model rather than this paper’s 14 firms
with different αj and rj and (2) sequential rather than simultaneous search. Haan et al.
(2017) establish theory and intuition for my result that higher search costs may tend to
lower prices and profits. Further, they explain how this result depends on what informa-
tion is available to consumers before they begin ther search. Haan et al. (2017) is one of
many papers extending Wolinsky (1986), in which consumers search to learn both prices
and idiosyncratic nonprice match values. In the Wolinsky model, consumers initially know
nothing about the individual firms and engage in random or undirected search. As observed
by Anderson and Renault (1999), the Wolinsky model “yields intuitive comparative statics
results: the equilibrium price rises with search costs and falls with the number of firms”.
Unlike in the Diamond (1971) model for homogeneous products, a small search cost gen-
erates only a small increase in prices. The contribution of Haan et al. (2017) is to show
that if consumers are informed about prices before searching (and can direct their search
accordingly by the Weitzman (1979) rule), prices instead fall as search costs increase.10
Haan et al. (2017) offer intuition for this reversal based on differences in the strength of
consumer preferences for ex ante observable nonprice quality (εijt in this paper’s notation).
To summarize and reframe this intuition, increased consumer search creates a perception
of product differentiation. If search costs are so high that consumers choose to search only
once, they effectively commit to a single firm at the search stage before learning any later-
10There are certain conditions on this result. Either the density of pre-search observed match values must
be log-concave or the search cost must be high enough.
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realized shocks: in this paper, (pijt − pj). Because I assume pijt − pj is a passthrough of a
cost shock rijt − rj , it does not directly affect the firm’s profit and has the same effect on
the model as the post-search taste shock assumed by Haan et al. (2017).
Whenever consumers must choose without observing the full extent of product differ-
entiation, market power is eroded and equilibrium prices are driven down. Haan et al.
(2017) reviews several empirical papers that estimate an increase in search costs would
either decrease prices (Pires (2018), Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2017)) or increase price elas-
ticities (Dubois and Perrone (2018), Koulayev (2014)). Papers in which search is for prices
and match values, or prices alone, are more likely to find an increasing relationship be-
tween search cost and price. Allen, Clark and Houde (2014) and Alexandrov and Koulayev
(2017) for instance assume that mortgage borrowers learn interest rates through search and
find that lower search costs would reduce equilibrium interest rates. For researchers and
policymakers, these contrasting results suggest the value of survey or other evidence on
the search process and on which product attributes consumers seek to learn by searching.
Alexandrov and Koulayev (2017) for instance (and Chapter 1 of this dissertation) take ad-
vantage of a survey of mortgage borrowers in estimating search models. Likewise for firms
and marketers, strategies of advertising and transparency should consider the sort of in-
formation being revealed. While firms may benefit from obfuscating their overall level of
prices (as in Ellison and Wolitzky (2012)), they will face increased competition and reduced
profits to the extent this obfuscation also hinders consumers from learning the horizontally
differentiating characteristics of each firm.
2.7.2 Switching costs
A separate literature originating with von Weizsa¨cker (1984) and Klemperer (1987) ad-
dresses the cost to a consumer of switching firms in a dynamic model. Klemperer (1987)
observes that switching costs weaken competition as the market becomes segmented into
consumers loyal to each firm. However, there is fierce competition in the first period as
firms seek to attract consumers who will subsequently become loyal to the firm. In a more
general many-period model with the possibility of price discrimination, a firm could offer
low “teaser rates” to new customers, to be increased later once the customer is attached to
the firm by a switching cost. In contrast, von Weizsa¨cker (1984) proposes a model in which
firms commit to a single price for all time:
a supplier who establishes a reputation for fair, nonexploitative treatment of
customers with switching costs, may be able to overcome the reluctance of
users to incur an ongoing cooperative relation with him, if users see that there
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is long run competition between this supplier and other suppliers and that there-
fore it would be shortsighted for a given supplier to exploit his customers and
thereby ruin his reputation.
The auto insurance industry combines some of the inertia exploitation of the Klemperer
model with the static fairness of the Weizsa¨cker model. Insurers are regulated in their rate
setting by state insurance commissioners, who may require them to justify departures from
a rate schedule. However, these regulations are not uniform in either their requirements or
their application. In 2020, the Maryland Insurance Administration rejected Allstate’s re-
quest to revise its auto insurance premia using a “customer retention” model. An analysis
by Consumer Reports and The Markup argues that the Allstate model would have based
premium increases on willingness to pay rather than solely on costs. Yet the analysis ob-
served that Allstate already used some form of “customer retention” pricing model in at
least ten other states (Varner and Sankin, 2020). What would be called “price discrimi-
nation” in standard economic terms has come to be classified under “price optimization”
in the language of firms and regulators. Price optimization is however broader and may
include using novel consumer-level databases to more accurately predict each customer’s
claims expenses. This usage is not price discrimination, but rather cost passthrough. Even
true price discrimination may be of the static sort that varies prices across customers, rather
than of the inertia exploitation sort that increases prices for the same customer at the time
of policy renewal.11
Given that my source data from Honka (2014) cannot distinguish premia for new poli-
cies from premia for renewals, I follow von Weizsa¨cker (1984) in reducing the firm’s pric-
ing problem to a one-shot decision. I obtain von Weizsa¨cker’s counterintuitive result that
more consumer inertia leads to more competition, here in the form of lower prices. To the
extent that firms do exploit consumer inertia by charging different premia for new poli-
cies and renewals, consumer inertia would likely reduce consumer welfare as proposed by
Klemperer (1987).
11A 2015 report by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) found that 45 percent of
large insurers used “price optimization” and a further 29 percent did not use it but had plans to start (National
Association of Insurance Commissioners: Casualty Actuarial and Statistical Task Force, 2015). The report
also refers to a 2013 survey of major insurers finding that 55 percent considered customer price elasticity when
choosing prices. It is unclear whether this question was understood to refer to the overall elasticity of market
demand or to the elasticity of demand for specific groups of consumers. The NAIC report recommended
interpreting statutory bans on “unfairly discriminatory” prices to include rates based on consumer differences
in price elasticity, propensity to shop for insurance, predicted retention rate, or propensity to ask questions or




This paper provides an empirical illustration of the theoretical results on search and switch-
ing costs in Haan et al. (2017) and von Weizsa¨cker (1984). I show that higher search costs
still tend to reduce prices, even when there are 14 non-identical firms rather than the sym-
metric duopoly in Haan et al. (2017). Intuitively, high search costs require firms to compete
more to be searched and less to be chosen conditional on being searched. The former con-
test is inherently more competitive than the latter when consumers use search to learn about
product differentiation. In the competition to be searched, firms do not possess the mar-
ket power that comes from a favorable idiosyncratic draw of a taste shock or fully passed
through cost shock. Switching costs also tend to decrease prices as firms compete more
intensely to gain loyal customers. Moreover, search and switching costs each continue to
exert these equilibrium effects in the presence of the other. I discuss ways in which these
results might be altered or reversed: for instance, in the original Wolinsky (1986) model
where consumers are uninformed about prices. The pivotal nature of such information as-
sumptions argues for further research into what information consumers know at the outset,
what they learn by search, and what they learn only after purchase.
For a firm, this paper’s results underline the importance of informing consumers about
product differentiation. Although some obfuscation or reticence about pricing may be ad-
vantageous, differentiating characteristics of the product should be communicated as ef-
ficiently as possible. Norms in certain industries may assist in communicating product
differentiation: a common search process or the provision of data to aggregator sites, col-
location of firms to ease consumer search (as documented by Murry and Zhou (2016) for
auto dealers), and sponsorship of comparison sites and independent reviewers. Ironically,
the standardization of certain product attributes may also increase the amount of product
differentiation communicated to consumers, as buyers of standardized products are able to
search efficiently and focus attention on attributes where meaningful differentiation exists.
This paper’s second conclusion is methodological. I develop methods to complete the
demand model of Honka (2014) with a supply side, creating a general model of search
and switching costs that can be applied to a variety of industries. These methods include
an efficient means of computing market shares and their derivatives at a given price (the
simulation method of holding out εij′t), an efficient means of predicting future market
shares (the Markov transition matrix), and an efficient means of solving the pricing game
(approximate best response iteration). Research that deals only with search costs or only
with switching costs may benefit from adopting some subset of these methods.
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Search set Min. εij′t Max. εij′t
{1, 10} −∞ 1.8055
{2, 1, 10} 1.8055 3.0164
{2, 1} 3.0164 +∞
Table 2.8.1: Illustration of optimal search sets, listing the sets that include firm j′ = 2 for




21st Century 3.06 6.31 0.03
AIG 3.34 6.71 0.04
Allstate 3.20 7.07 0.15
Farmers 3.28 6.23 0.05
Geico 2.66 5.89 0.20
GMAC 2.89 7.34 0.02
The Hartford 3.30 6.01 0.05
Liberty Mutual 3.56 7.05 0.05
Metlife 2.78 6.90 0.02
Nationwide 2.72 6.66 0.04
Progressive 3.17 6.47 0.13
Safeco 2.38 6.42 0.02
State Farm 2.91 7.04 0.14
Travelers 3.19 7.28 0.05
Table 2.8.2: Results from Model 0 of Honka (2014): nonprice quality αj , mean price
offers, and observed market shares. Honka (2014) separates the nonprice utility of a firm
into a portion due to advertising and an idiosyncratic portion, both of which are subsumed
into αj here. Three small insurers are excluded due to their limited geographic presence at
the time of the data collection: American Family, Erie, and Mercury.
Price coefficent γ 0.3978
Inertia coefficient β 1.3375
Scale parameter µ of the Gumbel price distribution 1.4517
Search cost c 0.1663
Table 2.8.3: Additional parameter estimates from Model 0 of Honka (2014). Prices are in
hundreds of dollars for six months of coverage.
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Table 2.8.4: Summary of cost estimation results under alternative assumptions of how much



















21st Century 4.01 0.64 1.46 3.05 7.68 – 7.88
AIG 4.38 0.65 1.59 4.29 9.18 – 9.40
Allstate 4.67 0.66 1.34 15.35 7.04 9.22 6.65
Farmers 3.87 0.62 1.74 5.33 10.81 4.27 11.07
Geico 3.47 0.59 1.28 19.95 6.64 13.45 6.05
GMAC 5.06 0.69 0.88 1.73 3.92 – 4.00
The Hartford 3.62 0.60 1.86 4.60 12.71 – 13.12
Liberty Mutual 4.74 0.67 1.68 5.13 10.14 4.79 10.37
Metlife 4.64 0.67 0.94 2.48 4.24 – 4.30
Nationwide 4.40 0.66 0.96 3.63 4.47 2.74 4.50
Progressive 4.08 0.63 1.54 13.46 8.77 11.01 8.53
Safeco 4.15 0.65 0.73 1.82 3.38 – 3.43
State Farm 4.66 0.66 1.06 14.29 5.06 17.07 4.67
Travelers 5.00 0.69 1.20 4.89 5.96 1.91 6.00
Table 2.8.5: Estimated marginal costs rj and actual and projected market shares.
The discounted market share is a sum of market shares from the data collection
in 2006 until 50 years later, discounted at a 6 percent annual rate and normal-











Progressive All insurance 2006 14.1 66.5 20.1 86.6
2005 13.8 68.0 20.1 88.1
2004 13.2 65.0 20.2 85.2
State Farm Auto 2007 31.7 78.7 20.6 99.3
2006 31.9 73.6 21.2 94.8
Geico “primarily” auto 2006 11.1 70.1 18.0 88.1
2005 10.1 70.6 17.3 87.9
2004 8.9 71.3 17.8 89.1
Allstate All insurance 2007 29.1 64.9 24.9 89.8
2006 29.3 58.5 25.1 83.6
2005 29.1 78.3 24.1 102.4
2004 28.1 68.7 24.3 93.0
2003 27.0 70.6 24.0 94.6
Table 2.8.6: Expenses of major insurers on claims and underwriting, as a share of rev-
enue from premiums. For some insurers, data includes insurance products other than auto
insurance. Source: Annual reports of the companies.












Est. 0.17 1.34 8.93 8.65 1.82 6.25 6.60
1 0.17 0.67 8.31 8.79 1.93 6.54 6.83
2 0.17 0.00 7.82 8.66 2.00 6.85 7.07
3 2.00 1.34 2.55 4.70 1.06 5.28 5.29
4 1.50 1.34 4.14 5.50 1.13 5.41 5.40
5 1.00 1.34 5.92 6.90 1.31 5.68 5.70
6 0.50 1.34 7.69 8.16 1.58 6.10 6.23
7 0.10 1.34 9.29 8.85 2.00 6.13 6.61
8 0.05 1.34 9.60 9.02 2.28 5.98 6.61
9 0.00 1.34 9.97 9.22 14.00 5.70 6.62
10 0.00 0.00 9.15 9.15 14.00 6.04 6.95
Table 2.8.7: Results of counterfactually varying the search cost c and inertia preference β.
The baseline price pj is weighted by observed market shares of firms. The average number
of searches with the estimated model differs from the average number of searches (2.96)
observed by Honka (2014), indicating some weakness in the fit of Model 0.
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Figure 2.8.1: Firms’ total surplus versus the increase in firm price choices when search or
switching costs are removed. Linear trend with 95 percent confidence interval.
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Appendix
2.A Price Derivatives of the Transition Matrix
The derivatives dPkj′
dpj
are needed both to estimate marginal costs and to construct the Taylor
approximation to the profit function for approximate best response iteration. To begin,










Pr(K searched|εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk = 0)
×Pr(j′ accepted|K searched, εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk = 0)]
+[Pr(K searched|εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk = 0)
× d
dpj
Pr(j′ accepted, εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk = 0)
The right hand side contains the search probability Pr(Ki searched|εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk =
0), the acceptance probability Pr(j′ accepted|K searched, εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk = 0), and their
derivatives with respect to the mean price offer chosen by firm j. The search probability is
found by identifying the optimal search set as a function of εij′t while simulating εijt for
all j 6= j′. The acceptance probability further simulates over price shocks pijt − pj for all
firms. These calculations are discussed in Section 2.5.
The derivative of the search probability Pr(Ki searched|εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk = 0) is a
function of how changes in prices affect the thresholds of εij′t that separate the optimal
search sets. Consider the threshold between search sets K and K ′. This threshold is the
value of εij′t such that the consumer has the same expected utility from each search set:
EU(K|εij′t, p)− EU(K ′|εij′t, p) = 0 (2.19)
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EU(K|εij′t, p)− EU(K ′|εij′t, p))
d
dεij′t
(EU(K|εij′t, p)− EU(K ′|εij′t, p))
(2.21)
Equation 2.21 can be easily evaluated by observing that conditional on the search set
K, an increase in pj′ affects only the utility of firm j′. The overall effect on expected utility
equals the change in the utility of firm j′ times the probability of firm j′ being chosen
conditional on search set K.
The derivative of the acceptance probability Pr(j′ accepted|K searched, εijt ∀j 6= j′,Wk =
0) is more difficult to evaluate, and I turn to an automatic differentiation routine for ease
and reliability (Julia’s ForwardDiff). Differentiation begins with the same approach
used to evaluate search probabilities. I simulate over εijt for j 6= j′ and over pijt − pj for
all j. Firm j′ is accepted if
αj′ − γpj′ + εij′t > αj − γpj + εijt ∀j 6= j′ (2.22)
which I write as a cutoff on the remaining unsimulated shock εij′t as
εij′t > αj − γpj + εijt − αj′ + γpj′ ∀j 6= j′ (2.23)
The probability of acceptance (conditional on search) is
Pr(εij′t > αj − γpj + εijt − αj′ + γpj′ ∀j 6= j′|K searched) (2.24)
where the conditioning reflects that εij′t is necessarily within a certain range given
that the consumer chose to search the set K. This range too depends on firms’ mean price
offers p. Differentiation of Equation 2.24 is complex but is readily handled by an automatic
differentiation program such as Julia’s ForwardDiff.
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Chapter 3
Generalized Linear Models for Demand
Estimation with Lightly Aggregated
Data
Researchers seeking to estimate structural demand models sometimes have the benefit of
lightly aggregated data. Instead of total unit sales of a few broadly defined products, lightly
aggregated data reports the allocation of unit sales across other levels such as within-
product varieties, retailers, time periods, or (groups of) consumers. Options that represent
the same product, time period, or other category may share some common effect in their
utility. With many distinct options for purchase, an individual option’s observed sales may
be low and thus subject to sampling error.
As applied to lightly aggregated data, aggregate data demand estimation following BLP
has some undesirable properties. First, BLP assume that the observed market shares are
equal to the underlying choice probabilities. Apart from leading to false precision in sta-
tistical inference, this assumption in disaggregate data may cause the model parameters to
overfit and capture chance variations in the choices of a few consumers. Further, there is
no easy or accepted method of restricting the model parameters to avoid overfitting. Each
option is allowed its own idiosyncratic fixed effect in the utility function, no matter how
few observed sales are available for estimating this effect.
This paper proposes an alternative estimation strategy specifically for lightly aggre-
gated data. Motivating this strategy is the observation that unit sales of each option follow
a binomial distribution to be modeled by binomial regression. Binomial regression falls
within the class of generalized linear models (GLM), which can be estimated in modern
standard statistical software with far less programming and computation time than methods
based on BLP. Further, binomial regression allows for restrictive fixed effect structures that
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can lessen the risk of overfitting. The key disadvantage of binomial regression is that it is
limited to the simple multinomial logit model rather than the mixed logit model of BLP.
However, I show that the Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) approximation to mixed logit can be
applied to binomial regression without substantially increasing the computational cost.
Section 3.2 reviews other approaches to disaggregate data used in the literature. Section
3.3 presents this paper’s methods: (1) a new representation of the data generating process
in which each observation of unit sales is a draw from a binomial distribution, (2) a re-
strictive multilevel structure of utility based on the researcher’s understanding of which
options share common factors in utility, and (3) an application of the Salanie´ and Wolak
(2019) linearization of mixed logit. Section 3.4 presents three Monte Carlo simulations.
The first simulation considers a simple binary in versus out choice and compares binomial
regression to alternative methods for dealing with sampling error such as Gandhi, Lu and
Shi (2017). In small markets with few sales, only binomial regression is successful at re-
covering the true parameter values. However, binomial regression requires that the outside
option is always a “safe” product in the sense of Gandhi, Lu and Shi (2017), meaning that
it is chosen by a large enough number of consumers that the sampling error in this number
is negligible. The second and third simulations consider a richer choice environment with
multiple products and multiple firms, with the third simulation demonstrating the Salanie´
and Wolak (2019) linearization of mixed logit. Compared to competing methods, this lin-
earization accepts some bias in return for computational speed and ease of implementation.
3.2 Literature
One common approach to demand estimation with lightly aggregated data has been to ap-
ply the same BLP-style methods used for aggregate data. Each option is treated as having
its own distinct mean utility, imposing no commonality among different options that be-
long to one or more of the same categories. Miravete et al. (2020) for instance model the
Pennsylvania liquor market with product-market-time fixed effects. With their reported
312 products, 454 markets, and 22 months, the authors would estimate over 3 million fixed
effects. Given that only 41 million bottles were sold in their data, each fixed effect may
be estimated from about 14 sales on average—or fewer for less popular products, creating
a high risk of overfitting the fixed effects to sampling error. Other papers that allow for
entirely distinct mean utility values within the same category include Murry (2017) (for ve-
hicle models, dealers, and model years) and Nevo (2000) (for cereal brands, cities, and time
at a quarterly frequency). This approach is well founded when the data is sufficiently ag-
gregated that sampling error is small and market shares are approximately equal to choice
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probabilities. In this case, there is no need for binomial regression or for a restrictive mul-
tilevel fixed effect structure. However, the Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) linearization may still
be useful in reducing computation time.
In some cases, researchers may have wished to estimate a BLP-style mixed logit model
but were prevented from doing so by the disaggregation of their data. In a paper using
product-store-week sales data, Mummalaneni et al. (2019) explain that although they con-
trol for various forms of observable heterogeneity in a multinomial logit model,
[c]ontrolling for unobservable heterogeneity as in Berry et al. (1995) is difficult
in this context due to the granularity of the data: computational feasibility is
only plausible if we aggregate across products, across stores,or across weeks—
this in turn would result in the loss of important variation in the data.
Simplifying to multinomial logit resolves the computational difficulties at some loss of
realistic substitution patterns. However, it does not address the concern that some product-
store-week options might have too few sales to reliably estimate a fully flexible fixed effect.
A second strand of work has supplemented disaggregate or lightly aggregated data with
aggregate data in which sampling error is assumed to be negligible. Chintagunta and Dube´
(2005) combine panel data on household grocery purchases with a larger aggregate dataset
from stores. Demand is estimated by maximum likelihood on the household data, sub-
ject to the constraint that the model correctly predicts sales in the aggregate data. Berry
et al. (2004) use disaggregate consumer-level survey data to add additional moments to
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation on aggregate data. Applications with
multiple levels of differentiation (e.g. product, retailer, market) may not have a single level
of aggregation to which these methods would apply.
A third strand, to which this paper belongs, probabilistically accounts for the sample
noise inherent in small or disaggregate data. Gandhi, Lu and Shi (2017) observe that the
quantity sold of a good j follows a binomial distribution: qj ∼ Binomial(M, sj), where
M is the number of consumers in the market and sj is the choice probability or asymptotic
market share. The authors propose probabilistic bounds on sj based on the realized qj . A
necessary assumption for Gandhi et al. (2017) is that some options are “safe”, in the sense
of having enough sales to accurately estimate their choice probabilities. Compared to the
Gandhi et al. (2017) method, binomial regression has the advantage of better performance
for low-sales products in small markets, and of easily accommodating multilevel fixed ef-
fects for products that share a common element of their utility due to membership in the
same category. In the alcohol example of Miravete, Seim and Thurk (2020), one choice of
category might be all red wines sold in a given time period, or at a given store. With appro-
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priately defined categories, the researcher may be able to conclude more about the quality
of each option than could be learned from the Gandhi et al. (2017) bounds constructed
solely based on the option’s own sales. The disadvantages of binomial regression com-
pared to Gandhi et al. (2017) are (1) the need for Assumption 1 below, which is satisifed
when the outside option is frequently chosen in every market and (2) substantial bias when
extending to mixed logit via the Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) linearization.
3.3 Model and estimation
Consumer i purchases product j from retailer or dealer d in market t. Alternatively the
consumer may purchase an outside option with mean utility normalized to zero. An inside
option’s utility is given by
uijdt = δjdt + εijdt (3.1)
where δjdt = Hjdtγ + ξJj + ξ
D
d (3.2)
HereHjdt is a vector of attributes of the particular combination j, d, t and potentially in-
cluding attributes such as market demographics or travel time to the retailer. The multilevel
fixed effect structure ξJj + ξ
D
d is less flexible compared to the more commonly estimated
ξjdt but is therefore less susceptible to overfitting—provided, of course, that the multilevel
structure approximates the true utility model. Other fixed effect specifications could also
be accommodated in the binomial regression framework, e.g. adding a market fixed effect
ξTt .
The idiosyncratic error εijdt is distributed Gumbel(0, 1). The resulting choice probabil-







The product fixed effects ξJj will generally be a function of observable product charac-
teristicsXj .
ξJj = Xjβ + ζ
J
j (3.4)
I assume that the researcher observes Mt, qjdt, Xj , and instruments Zj to account for
any correlation between ζJj and elements ofXj .
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3.3.1 Multinomial logit
Fix a particular option (j, d, t) and consider a consumer in market t who is known to be
choosing either (j, d, t) or the outside option (which has choice probability s0t). The con-
























Define analogously the conditional market size M˜ = Mt(s0t + sjdt). I approximate M˜t
by the sum of unit sales q0t + qjdt, which is equal to M˜t in expectation.
Assumption 1. There is negligible error in the approximation q0t + qjdt = Mt(s0t + sjdt)
Assumption 1 is weaker than the usual BLP assumption of qjdt = Mtsjdt. Rather than
assuming that each option has enough observed sales to compute its choice probability, I
assume that the outside option and each inside option together have enough sales to com-
pute the sum of their choice probabilities. This assumption is most closely satisfied when
both the unconditional market size Mt and the outside option share s0t are large.1
Subjection to Assumption 1, (j, d, t) has unit sales distributed
qjdt ∼ Binomial(q0t + qjdt, exp(δjdt)
1 + exp(δjdt)
) (3.8)
Equation 3.8 relates the unobserved utility δjdt to observed sales through a standard dis-
tributional form: the binomial distribution with binary logit link function. Further, Equa-
tion 3.4 states that δjdt is a linear function of its parameters. These parameters can thus be
estimated by the standard technique of binomial regression.
I estimate Equation 3.8 in R using the package glmmboot, a fast bootstrap maximum
likelihood algorithm for generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) regression that is capa-
ble of profiling out one level of fixed effects. For the fastest solution, the level with the
most categories should be selected to be profiled out while other levels of fixed effects are
included as factor variables. Similar functionality is available in other software (e.g. the
1In applications where there is no outside option or where the outside option is rarely chosen, a commonly
chosen product can play the role of the outside option by having its utility normalized to zero.
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melogit command in Stata, or the MixedModels package in Julia). Following estima-
tion of Equation 3.8, Equation 3.4 can be estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS) to
recover an estimate of β.
The estimation copes naturally with the possibility of a zero empirical market share for
a single option qjdt = 0. An empirical market share of zero prevents estimation of the
standard aggregate data logit or BLP model, unless a correction is applied as in Gandhi
et al. (2017). Yet a similar problem occurs in binomial regression, albeit at a higher level
of aggregation. If any fixed effect ξDd or ξ
J
j has qjdt = 0 for every option in which it
occurs, then the maximum likelihood estimate of that fixed effect is−∞. Apart from being
unreasonable, such a result shuts down any analysis of how product attributes relate to ξJj .
I therefore assume that
Assumption 2.
For all j, ∃(d, t) such that qjdt > 0
For all d, ∃(j, t) such that qjdt > 0
Ideally one would hope for a much stronger condition: that each fixed effect is esti-
mated from so many observed purchases that there is little sampling error. To the extent
that sampling error occurs, it is accounted for in estimation and decreases the estimated pre-
cision of the results. The researcher can respond to excessive sampling error by collecting
additional data or imposing more commonality in fixed effects by combining categories.
3.3.2 Extension to mixed logit
The mixed logit model allows consumers to differ in their valuations of product character-
istics, leading to more flexible and realistic substitution patterns. For a mixed logit model,
modify Equation 3.4 by inserting a random vector vi ∼ Normal(0,Σ), independent across
consumers.
uijdt = δjdt +Xjvi + εijdt (3.9)









The traditional approach is to evaluate this integral by simulation. Market shares de-
pend nonlinearly on Σ, requiring a nonlinear optimization to estimate Σ by generalized
method of moments (GMM). Moreover, the researcher must solve at every optimization
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iteration for the fixed effect values that best explain the observed market shares given Σ.
BLP solve this subproblem using a nested fixed point algorithm to fit a fully flexible δjdt
for each option. This approach is slow and subject to numerical error, leading Dube´, Fox
and Su (2012) and Lee and Seo (2015) to propose improvements: the former reframing
the contraction mapping as a constrained optimization, the latter linearizing the depen-
dence of market shares on δjdt. All of these approaches are significantly more complex
and computation-intensive than binomial regression. Moreover, they do not account for
sampling error (without further modification), and cannot readily accommodate multilevel
fixed effects to prevent overfitting.
Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) observe that the transformation log( sjdt
s0t
) of the mixed logit
market shares 3.10 can be approximated by a Taylor series in Σ. Their paper develops
a 2SLS estimation strategy based on this linearization, circumventing the computational
complexity of BLP-style methods at the cost of some approximation error. The remain-
der of this subsection shows how the same linearization allows mixed logit models to be
estimated by binomial regression.
Let m index the various product characteristics in Xj . As implied by Theorem 2 in





















whereK is a set of artificial regressors to be defined as functions of product character-
istics and market shares. First, for each market t define the market share weighted covariate
vector et =
∑
j sjdtXjdt. Let I be the set of pairs (m,n) of characteristics where Σmn is
not assumed to be zero. For each option (j, d) in t and for each pair of indices (m,n) ∈ I,













































which gives the probability of choosing (j, d, t) conditional on choosing either (j, d, t)
or the outside option. As in Equation 3.8 for the multinomial logit, unit sales have a bino-
mial distribution
qjdt ∼ Binomial(q0t + qjdt, exp(δjdt)
1 + exp(δjdt)
) (3.19)
where q0t + qjdt approximates Mt(s0t + sjdt) by Assumption 1. It is thus possible to
estimate the parameters β,Σ, ζJ , ξD by binomial regression, where Equation 3.13 now
forms the input to the logit link function. This procedure is applied in the last Monte Carlo
simulation of Section 3.4. Importantly, the artificial regressors K are endogenous due to
their construction from market shares and will typically require instruments. As proposed
by Salanie´ and Wolak (2019), the instruments for K and those for any endogenous ele-
ments of X may be functions of the same set of variables Z, and of exogenous elements
of X . In this paper, I assume for ease of exposition that X is exogenous and use only the
portion of the Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) instruments based solely onX .
Although binomial regression accounts for sampling error in qjdt as an outcome, it does
not account for the sampling error inherent in using the noisy empirical market shares sjdt
to construct the regressorsK. However, the construction ofK sums over the market shares
of all products in the market, potentially reducing the impact of sampling error.2
2If the sampling error inK is expected to be severe, it may be advisable to replace the market shares with
Bayesian estimates of their asymptotic shares following Gandhi et al. (2017).
83
3.4 Monte Carlo simulations
Three Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate the value of binomial regression for lightly
aggregated data: to account for sampling error (including the case of zero observed sales),
to estimate multilevel fixed effects, and to combine these benefits with the computationally
efficient Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) approach to mixed logit estimation.
The first simulation considers a simple binary choice between a single inside good with
utility β + εi1t and an outside option with utility εi0t. The inside good is of poor quality
with β = −9, implying that its unit sales will be subject to substantial sampling error when
the market size Mt is small. Depending on the simulation, the market size ranges from 100
to 1,000,000.
Using this simulated data, I compare binomial regression with two competing correc-
tions for sampling error, the first of which is flawed but often used in empirical work for its
simplicity. Rather than fully account for the sampling error in market shares, the researcher
only addresses the zero market shares that would otherwise block estimation. OLS logit
estimation defines the dependent variable log( sjdt
s0t
), which is undefined if sjdt is taken to
be its observed value of zero. Reallocating one sale from the outside option allows the




) = Xjβ + ξjdt (3.20)
Gandhi, Lu and Shi (2017) observe that this naive correction introduces bias, as do
similar methods such as dropping options with zero observed sales. They propose instead
a set of probabilistic bounds on the true choice probabilities, with an estimation strategy
that seeks to minimize departures from these bounds. The bounds on each option’s mean









where s˜0t is the “Laplace share” of the outside good, shifted toward the interior of the
[0, 1] interval.3 Defining Jt as the number of products in market t (excluding the outside
3Specifically, s˜0t = qt+1qt+Jt+Mt .
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Market size Mean β0 s.e.
100 Binomial -9.07 0.0324
OLS -2.20 0.0000
Gandhi [-709.76, -3.12] [0.0275, 0.0001]
1,000 Binomial -9.02 0.0086
OLS -4.60 0.0000
Gandhi [-704.41, -5.29] [0.0738, 0.0001]
10,000 Binomial -9.00 0.0027
OLS -6.90 0.0001
Gandhi [-633.41, -7.46] [0.2062, 0.0003]
100,000 Binomial -9.00 0.0008
OLS -8.90 0.0004
Gandhi [-215.15, -8.88] [0.3152, 0.0006]
1,000,000 Binomial -9.00 0.0003
OLS -9.04 0.0003
Gandhi [-9.04, -9.00] [0.0003, 0.0003]
Table 3.4.1: Comparison of three estimation methods for a binary choice problem: bino-
mial regression, OLS (reallocating one sale from the outside to the inside option if the
inside option has zero sales), and the Gandhi et al. (2017) bounds method. The true β0 is




Mt + Jt + 1
(3.23)
The scalars lu and l` are chosen as functions of Mt and are constructed to guarantee
proper coverage of the bounds whatever the true choice probability sjt. Details of this
construction are given in Gandhi et al. (2017). The result is that l` is a small positive
number while lu ranges from 0.405 for Mt = 10 to 0.509 for Mt = 10, 000 (conditional on
a binary choice environment). The Gandhi et al. (2017) estimator minimizes a function of
the deviations from these bounds.
Table 3.4.1 presents simulation results from the extreme case of β0 = −9, implying that
about 1 in 1,000 consumers purchases the product. Binomial regression outperforms the
naive OLS solution, with the disparity decreasing as market size increases. Comparisons
to the Gandhi method are less straightforward as it identifies sets rather than points. While
the set estimates did in every case contain the true parameter value, they were too broad to
be of practical use in even fairly large markets (Mt = 100, 000).
The disparity in Table 3.4.1 can be explained by contrasting the Gandhi method’s use of
moment inequalities with the maximum likelihood approach of binomial regression. Fix-
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ing M = 10, the Gandhi approach interprets a market with zero sales as imposing an upper
bound on β0 of δu = −3.12. Observing many such markets in the Gandhi method provides
further evidence that β0 ≤ −3.12, but does not serve to tighten this bound. Binomial re-
gression instead takes full advantage of these repeated observations. It would be unlikely to
observe zero sales in almost all markets if β0 were as high as−3.12, and a higher likelihood
can be obtained from the true β0 = −9. Binomial regression thus combines information
from across markets in the form of likelihood contributions, allowing for estimation on
small markets that provide little useful information individually.
Gandhi et al. (2017) present Monte Carlo simulations in which their method produces
correct estimates despite most options having zero sales. They assume a data generating
process in which 99 percent of options are of uniform and low quality while the remaining 1
percent are of variable and high quality. It is the presence of the high-quality products, and
the variation in their quality, that makes the estimation successful. Because the markets are
large (Mt = 10, 000), the high-quality products are “safe” in Gandhi et al.’s terminology:
their actual market shares are roughly equal to their expected market shares. As Table 3.4.1
shows, disaggregate data with small markets may not have any “safe” products, motivat-
ing the use of binomial regression to fully leverage the information from “risky” products
across many markets.
The second and third simulations turn to the case of a multiproduct market, in which a
few products appear repeatedly as options across many markets. In the second simulation,
a set of 200 national brand products are allocated randomly across 10 retailers, with each
retailer offering 20 of these products. The same national brand product may be offered by
multiple retailers. Each dealer contributes utility ξDd ∼ Uniform(−1, 1) to all of its options.
To add a difficulty to the estimation that motivates the use of a dealer fixed effects, dealers
with ξDd > 0 stock only those national products with X1 > 0. In addition, each retailer
offers (with equal probability) either 0, 1, or 2 generic products specific to the retailer.
Each of 1,000 markets (of 100 consumers each) has access to two random retailers. Utility
follows the exposition in Section 3.3 and is the sum of utility ξDd from the retailer, utility
Xjβ from researcher-observed product characteristics, utility ζJj ∼ Uniform(−1, 1) from
an unobserved product characteristic, and an idiosyncratic shock εijdt ∼ Gumbel(0, 1).
The product characteristics are a constant (associated with β0 = −5) and a scalar product
characteristic (with β1 = 1). The third simulation additionally assumes a Normal(0, 1)
random coefficient on the characteristic. Notably, the third simulation also replaces the
binary X1 with one distributed Normal(0, 1). This revision to X1 is necessary due to the
Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) requirement of instruments for K. The subset {X1, X21 , X31} of
the Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) instruments would be repetitive with a binary X1, implying
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βˆ0 βˆ1
Estimate (Model FE) -5.02 1.01
s.e. (0.021) (0.0115)
Estimate (Characteristics) -4.85 1.00
s.e. (0.0202) (0.0145)
Estimate (Gandhi, fixing β0) -5.00 [-241, 1.73]
Estimate (Gandhi, fixing β1) [-247, -4.27] 1.00
Table 3.4.2: Results of three estimation methods for a multinomial logit choice process.
The true coefficients are β0 = −5, β1 = 1. The first specification (“Model FE”) estimates a
binomial regression of sales on product and retailer fixed effects, then regresses the product
fixed effects on product characteristics to obtain βˆ0, βˆ1. The second specification (“Char-
acteristics”) estimates a binomial regression of sales on product characteristics and retailer
fixed effects, effectively ignoring the impact of idiosyncratic product utility ζJj . The Gandhi
estimates show a cross through the set identified by the method of Gandhi et al. (2017),
with intersection at the true parameters. Data: 1,000 markets of 100 consumers each. Full
details of the data generating process are in the text.
that the model would not be identified without additional excluded instruments as Salanie´
and Wolak (2019) assume are available.
Table 3.4.2 shows the results of the second simulation, which reliably recovers the co-
efficients given a sufficiently large sample. The main specification proceeds by a binomial
regression of sales on product and retailer fixed effects, followed by a linear regression of
the product fixed effects on product characteristics to obtain the parameters of interest. Also
shown in Table 3.4.2 is a faster but less accurate alternative: a single binomial regression
of sales on product characteristics and retailer fixed effects.
Table 3.4.2 also shows the results of the Gandhi method, which now produces two-
dimensional set estimates (βˆ0, βˆ1). In every simulation, these sets included the true param-
eters. To summarize the Gandhi set estimates, I trace a cross over the identified set with
intersection at the true parameters. That is, I find (1) βˆ0 such that (βˆ0, β1) is within the set
estimate and (2) βˆ1 such that (β0, βˆ1) is within the set estimate. With a small market size,
I find that this cross is large (and so the identified set is larger still). As in the binary logit
case of Table 3.4.1, the Gandhi approach relies on the presence of large markets in which
at least some options are “safe”, i.e. likely to have market shares approximately equal to
their expected market shares.
The third simulation (Table 3.4.3) shows that binomial regression can be adapted to
study the mixed logit model using the approximation of Salanie´ and Wolak (2019). As sug-
gested by Salanie´ and Wolak (2019), the estimates σˆ2 are biased toward zero, i.e. toward
the multinomial logit model. Nonetheless, this bias may be acceptable if computational
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σ2 Market size βˆ0 βˆ1 σˆ2
0.4 100 -4.865 1.013 0.286
(0.020) (0.009) (0.018)
0.2 100 -4.881 1.011 0.178
(0.019) (0.010) (0.018)
0.4 100,000 -4.827 1.004 0.270
(0.018) (0.009) (0.017)
0.2 100,000 -4.888 1.004 0.162
(0.020) (0.008) (0.016)
0.1 100,000 -5.006 1.000 0.090
(0.017) (0.000) (0.000)
0.05 100,000 -4.987 1.000 0.047
(0.017) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 3.4.3: Results of binomial regression for mixed logit, using the Salanie´ and Wolak
(2019) linearization. The data generating process is as in Table 3.4.2 except that (1) there
is a normally distributed random coefficient on X1, with variance σ2 and (2) the product
characteristic X1 is distributed Normal(0, 1) instead of DiscreteUniform(0, 1).
concerns or an absence of “safe” high-sales options prevents the researcher from imple-
menting an exact mixed logit model. Some performance improvements may be possible
without resorting to full mixed logit estimation. For example, Salanie´ and Wolak (2019)
propose a bias correction based on the third and fourth-order terms of their linearization.
The market shares used to construct K could also be corrected by the Bayesian methods
discussed in Gandhi et al. (2017). Alternatively, the full Gandhi et al. (2017) method could
be implemented to generate estimates that are likely to be less biased provided that some
safe products are available to achieve identification.
3.5 Conclusion
Binomial regression is a standard approach to true individual-level microdata, in which
case it becomes logit regression. This paper shows that binomial regression remains useful
when consumer choices are aggregated, but not to the extent that a law of large numbers
implies that market shares are equal to choice probabilities.
For multinomial logit demand, binomial regression is equivalent to maximum likeli-
hood estimation as long as Assumption 1 holds. Binomial regression treats each option’s
sales as independent within a market (conditional on parameters), and therefore cannot in-
corporate mixed logit demand directly in a way that corresponds to maximum likelihood.
However, the Salanie´ and Wolak (2019) linearization can approximate the realism of mixed
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logit demand, without any major sacrifice of speed. In this way, binomial regression seeks
a balance between speed and realism while addressing a third, increasingly frequent re-
quirement of small-sample robustness.
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Conclusion
This dissertation leverages disaggregate data to address issues of price discrimination and
consumer search and switching, as well as methods for demand estimation. Price discrimi-
nation plays a substantial role in the mortgage market, suggesting a need for consumers to
negotiate effectively rather than simply broaden their search to additional lenders. In the
auto insurance market, search may in aggregate fail to benefit consumers as firms increase
their prices to take advantage of the product differentiation revealed by search. Chapter 3
turns to methodology and shows that binomial regression may be used to estimate a logit
demand model using lightly aggregated data where large-market assumptions fail to apply.
If one is willing to accept some approximation error, binomial regression can also be used
to estimate a mixed logit model without the usual computational difficulties.
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